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ABSTRACT
Complex decision-making may be aided by forms of automation known as
decision-support systems (DSS). However, no DSS is completely reliable and so it is
imperative that users know when they should and should not trust it (calibration of trust).
Previous research has shown that providing users with information about the DSS’s
confidence in its own advice (“system confidence”) can help improve the calibration of
user’s trust of automation and actual system reliability on a trial by trial basis. The
current study examined how the nature of the presentation of system confidence
information affected user’s trust calibration. The first study examined the attentional
demand of each display, while the second study examined their effect on trust and
performance on a decision making task. The results of this study indicate that there was
no effect of system confidence display type on subjective or objective trust. The lack of
differences in performance or trust between the control condition (no system confidence
display) and other displays raises doubts about whether users were utilizing the system
confidence information or using reliability information. The type of decision task may be
crucial in determining whether to provide system confidence and these results suggest
that it should be tested prior to implementation against a control group, unlike previous
studies. The results of these studies have implications in the design of DSS, especially
given the difficulty of providing accurate system confidence information to users. The
time and resources that would be required to provide such a display may not be beneficial
if it has no effect on user trust or decision performance.
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INTRODUCTION
Decision support systems (DSS) are automated systems that have the potential to
help users make better decisions when there are numerous options and many attributes to
consider. For example, when purchasing a computer online, the consumer may input the
purpose of use (e.g., emailing or gaming), what features they value most (e.g., hard drive
space, processing speed). Based on this information, the web-based aid may present the
best choices of machines based on the user’s needs. When purchasing a Medicare
prescription drug plan using parameters such as a monthly and yearly budget maximums
and coverage minimums, the options vary across several attributes and what’s best for
one person may not be the best for everyone. These types of decisions can be difficult if
the consumer has no prior domain knowledge. For example, our computer consumer
might need to understand the slight differences between attributes (e.g., types of RAM,
monitor backlights) while our Medicare shopper must know the jargon (e.g., gap
coverage or donut hole).
Fortunately, decision aids can help consumers narrow down the options,
simplifying the decision-making process. There are also other DSSs such as GPS to help
users find destinations more efficiently, financial DSSs that help predict future outcomes,
and medical devices that help users make healthier choices. In all of these cases, the
operator is the consumer who may be making a one-time or infrequent decision (e.g.,
kiosk or “walk-up-and-use”). The consumer may not be able to practice extensively to
develop trust in the same manner that workplace operators of control systems do based on
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practice over time, training, and explicitly-provided knowledge about the DSS’s
reliability.
Most of the research in human-machine interaction with DSSs has focused on the
workplace operator using complex automation, typically in high stress, high risk
scenarios (e.g., Hancock & Parasuraman, 1992; Hilburn, Jorna, Byrne, & Parasuraman,
1997; Parasuraman & Hancock, 2008). This body of research has focused on designing
systems that foster appropriate trust between the user and machine so that the benefits of
a DSS can be realized and catastrophic events are avoided. While research for those types
of systems is undoubtedly important, consumer DSSs impact the lives and health of many
people as well. It’s important then, to examine whether factors that lead to appropriate
trust in highly risk scenarios are the same as those in a consumer decision task and
determine whether the results of those studies can be extended to the consumer domain.
Research on trust in automation has shown that providing system confidence (or
an estimation of how confident the system is in making its recommendation) may help
users determine when to trust and not trust DSSs. Using our prior example, the Medicare
shopper may benefit from knowing that the DSS is 75% confident that the plan it is
recommending matches their needs. Several studies have shown that providing the user
with a display of system confidence can improve appropriate use of DSSs in
identification tasks and domain-specific (e.g., aviation) strategy decisions (McGuirl &
Sarter, 2004; Spain & Bliss, 2009). Providing system confidence may also be able to
improve appropriate use of consumer DSS.
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The main purpose of this study was to examine the use of anthropomorphic
presentations of system confidence. Prior research has shown that system confidence
information can improve performance by influencing appropriate trust (i.e., using the
automation only when it is accurate). In this study, we are specifically examining the
mode of presentation of system confidence. Furthermore, this study aims to extend
system confidence and automation research to consumer based DSSs, specifically in the
context of choosing supplemental prescription drug plans.
Types of Automation
Automation can be classified by the type of task it performs and how it augments
human performance at different stages of information processing. Parasuraman,
Sheridan, & Wickens (2000) provide a classification for types of automation that map
directly onto the stages of the information processing model (see Figure 1). This
classification is important because it outlines the level of interaction between the human
and automation. The type of consumer decision support system that this study focuses
on is one designed to support decision making by reducing the amount of cognitive
resources (i.e., attention, working memory) required to compare many options consisting
of numerous attributes, and instead leaves the processing up to the DSS. DSSs that help
users through the decision and action selection stage can be further defined by how much
autonomy is given to the user and the automation (see Figure 2). The current study
focuses on a DSS that consumers are likely to encounter; systems that fall between level
3 (the computer narrows choices down to a select few) and level 4 (the computer suggests
one alternative).
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Figure 1. Stages of information processing, above, with automation classification types,
below (adapted from Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000).

Figure 2. Levels of human interaction with automation and stages of information
processing mapped onto types of automation (adapted from Parasuraman, Sheridan, &
Wickens, 2000).
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Decision Making and Automation
When the task requires more cognitive resources than the decision maker has
available, the task can be considered a resource-limited task (Norman & Bobrow, 1975).
Performance on a resource-limited task can only be improved if more resources are
available to commit to the task. This is contrasted with data-limited tasks where
providing more information can improve performance. For example, given a choice
among 15 health insurance plans, the decision maker is faced with many comparisons
along different attributes. This task is resource-demanding (as shown in a task analysis;
Price & Pak, accepted) in that it requires working memory, numerical calculations, and
comparisons. Particularly, non-compensatory decisions are resource demanding because
users cannot make tradeoffs between attributes of options. Instead, each option must be
considered attribute by attribute. In resource-limited tasks, providing more data (i.e.,
another option, attribute, or system confidence information) that the participant must
consider will not improve performance because no resources are available to allocate to
the new information.
DSSs may be most useful for decisions tasks that are resource-limited when the
DSS is able to process all or part of the information, freeing resources for the decision
maker. Ideally, decision makers would consider all options analytically, comparing each
attribute for every decision option (i.e., expected utility approach). Decision makers
faced with compensatory decisions in a resource-limited task and under time pressure
cannot consider all options analytically (i.e., expected utility or tallying approach).
Instead, decision makers tend to rely on other, less resource demanding strategies such as
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a take the best strategy (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996), satisficing (Gigarenzer &
Goldstein, 1996; Simon, 1955), or elimination by aspects (Tversky, 1972). These
strategies reduce the amount of decision information that is attended to and the number of
comparisons that are made, thus reducing resource demand. The benefit, then, of a level 4
DSS is that it does the processing required to consider all options analytically and
algorithmically, provides a suggested option, but then leaves the judgment of the decision
(whether or not to follow the automation’s suggestion) up to the decision maker.
In level 4 automation, users must decide whether to follow the suggested option
or expend resources verifying the suggestion. They have several options: 1) trust the DSS
and agree with the option, 2) verify the option, then either agree or disagree, or 3)
disagree, or distrust the system and find a suitable answer on their own. This stage of an
information processing model of decision making, where the user must decide whether to
trust the automation, is called the evaluation of outcomes stage. Users will sometimes
resort to using judgment heuristics at the evaluation of outcomes stage when there is high
workload or time pressure. Instead of expending time and resources double checking the
automation’s suggestion, the user may place value on past exemplar experiences
(representative heuristic; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), ease of retrieval (availability
heuristic; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), emotions (affect heuristic; Slovic, et al., 2005),
or characteristics of the automation itself (e.g., anthropomorphic features). However,
sometimes heuristic use leads to automation biases, when the user mistrusts or distrusts
the system. Ideally, the user should be able to trust the DSS; however, no automated
system is 100% reliable.

6

Basis of Trust in Automation
Trust, in the context of human-automation interaction, is the “attitude that an
agent will help achieve an individual’s goals in a situation characterized by uncertainty
and vulnerability” (Lee & See, 2004, p 54). Trust is an affective response to features and
interactions between the decision maker and the automation. A fundamental issue with
automation is how to appropriately calibrate user’s trust with actual system reliability, so
that the user always uses automation when it is appropriate and does not use it when it is
inappropriate. Calibration has been defined as the “correspondence between a person’s
trust in the automation and the automation’s capabilities” (Lee & See, 2004; Muir, 1987).
Thus, calibration depends on both system factors (e.g., how reliably the automation helps
the user reach a goal) and human factors (e.g., whether the user trusts and complies with
the automated).
Improper calibration can lead to performance decrements. If the user does not
trust the automated system when it is in fact reliable (i.e. distrust or disuse), the
consequence is less efficient performance because effort is allocated to “double
checking” (i.e., a cost of verification). Misuse, on the other hand is the “overreliance on
automation” (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997, p. 233) and occurs when the user
inappropriately uses the automation for a task or decision it was not designed for or under
conditions when the automation cannot make a valid choice (e.g., incomplete source
data).
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Two types of trust: Dispositional trust and history-based trust
Trust can be differentiated by its source (Merritt & Ilgen, 2008; Kramer, 1999).
First, dispositional trust is the initial trust in a system before the user has extensive
practice with the machine (i.e., the DSS). Dispositional trust is primarily affected by
individual differences in personality, propensity to trust, self-confidence, as well as initial
impressions of the features of the DSS (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). For example, domain
experience can also influence how users perceive errors and error attribution (Sanchez,
2006). Self confidence can affect trust because automation is more likely to be used if
users have higher trust in the automation’s capability to do the task than in their own
ability (Lee & Moray, 1994). .
Second, history-based trust is a product of experience with a system and thus is
shaped after the user has experience with the DSS. History-based trust is built upon how
well matched the user’s expectations of how the DSS will perform are to actual DSS
performance (i.e., reliability and predictability). Although they are different constructs,
initial perceptions (dispositional trust) can mediate human and machine characteristics
and history-based trust (Merritt & Ilgen). Merritt & Ilgen stress the importance of
measuring initial trust at different points of human-automation interaction, and individual
differences in propensity to trust, when examining the impacts of machine characteristics
on trust and outcomes of trust (i.e., performance). This distinction between dispositional
and history-based trust is important in the current context because the user of common
consumer-facing systems will have only dispositional trust and little or no history-based
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trust. Presenting system confidence information may provide this additional type of trust
instantly.
DSS characteristics that influence trust
Trust may come from three general sources: performance, process, and purpose
(see Lee & See, 2004 for a thorough review) (Lee & Moray, 1992; Lee & See, 2004).
The performance source of trust “describes what the automation does”, and is
“demonstrated by its ability to achieve the operator’s goals” (Lee & See, 2004, p 59).
Dispositional trust or initial perception of the DSS can be influenced by presenting the
operator with the reliability of the system. When told that reliability is high (>70%), trust
in and reliance on automation increases. When reliability is low (<60%), users tend to
distrust the automation, and thus will not rely on the automation and instead will likely
switch to manual control (Dzindolet, et al, 2003; Lee & See 2004). However, trust and
reliance are two separate constructs (Weigmann, Rich, & Zhang, 2001). Trust is an
affective response, while reliance is a behavior. One can have low trust, but still rely on
the automation because time constraints or workload makes it hard for the user to make
the decision on their own.
Purpose describes the “degree to which the automation is being used within the
realm of the designer’s intent” and “describes why the automation was developed” (Lee
& See, 2004, p 59). Operators should understand the purpose of the automated aid so as
not to misuse the automation in situations where it is inappropriate. Purpose may be
influenced initially by the user’s initial perceptions of trustworthiness (e.g., a
dispositional trust factor). How polite the system is, whether it matches their personality
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type, and what it looks like all may influence the decision maker’s initial impression of
trustworthiness. Purpose may also influence history-based trust. As the user gains
experience with the system, he or she forms an opinion on how well the system matches
the intended purpose.
Process is the “degree to which the automation’s algorithms are appropriate for
the situation and able to achieve the operator’s goals” and “describes how the automation
operates” (Lee & See, 2004, p 59). This dimension has less to do with actual
performance and instead focuses on characteristics of the automated aid itself, such as
understanding of the rules that govern the system, dispositional attributions and
inferences (rather than actual reliability), and openness. Relying more on dispositional
attributions and inferences makes process different than performance; performance relies
on history-based trust and actual performance accuracy. This is similar to how people
base trust in social interactions with humans (rather than machines) (Lee & See, 2004).
When people receive advice from another human, they may judge the trustworthiness of
the other person by their facial expressions, intonation, body language, personality, and
etiquette (Parasuraman & Miller, 2004). History-based trust may be formed through
previous interactions and outcomes of taking advice from that person. If there is not a
history of interaction between the advisee and the advice giver, then initial perceptions
(dispositional trust) may influence decision making. The decision maker may look for
evidence of confidence from the advice giver as a source of validity of a single
recommendation (Parasuraman & Miller).
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As described earlier, a major problem in human-automation interaction is the
calibration of a user’s trust in the automation. Complacency refers to a user’s over trust
of automation especially when reliability is high (Parasuraman & Manzey, 2010). User’s
may become disconnected or lose situation awareness when this automation complacency
occurs because they are “out of the loop” (i.e., do not have a good sense of how or why
the automation came to its recommendation). One way to help users become more aware
of the automation is by giving the user more information about the level of confidence
that the automation has in its own recommendation. This may be functionally similar to
getting advice from a friend where the person gives a likelihood of being correct.
System Confidence
One method of displaying a DSS’s process information and thus reducing
automation bias is by providing an estimate of system confidence (Parasuraman &
Manzey, 2010). System confidence is the system’s expression of how likely it believes it
is correct and is based on the data it has available. One example of how system
confidence could be used is with a GPS navigation system. The accuracy of the system is
dependent on the quality of the information it is using to base its recommendation. The
quality of the data could include: a) number of satellites it has locked-on to, b) the
strength of the satellite signals, and c) date on which the maps were downloaded. A high
confidence scenario would occur if there were a high number of locked-on satellites, high
signal strength, and maps no older than 6 months. Conversely, a low confidence scenario
would occur if the GPS only had a few satellites locked-on, the signal strength was weak,
and the maps were older than 1 year. In this situation, the GPS may provide the user with
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a percentage of the signal strength (i.e., its own measure of system confidence) giving the
user information about its own certainty based on the underlying data.
In a perfect system, high system confidence would always be correlated to
reliability and thus trusting a highly confident system would lead to good performance.
However, system confidence may not always be positively correlated with reliability and
performance. If the DSS is getting degraded or is receiving incomplete information and
thus has low system confidence, it still may have high reliability (or unchanged
reliability), and may provide a suggestion that is accurate (and possibly better than one
the user may find on their own). Accurately assessing system confidence in a real world
system may be difficult to program. However, researching the effects of system
confidence on trust may help determine if it is useful enough for designers of automated
systems to pursue.
Providing system confidence information to users has been shown to reduce
automation bias because decision makers are better able to assess the validity of the
recommendation (Parasuraman & Miller). Providing system confidence may increase the
user’s initial perceptions of trustworthiness (i.e., dispositional trust, Lee & See, 2004).
McGuirl & Sarter (2006) examined the effects of providing system confidence
information on trust calibration, compliance, and performance with a DSS that helped
pilots with in-flight de-icing procedures. Their definition of system confidence was, “an
accurate system-generated prediction of its own accuracy” (p 660). They examined the
combination of providing task level system confidence (process information) and
historical information (from the past 5 trials). Participants were placed either in a “fixed”

12

condition where only the overall reliability of the system was known (70%) or in an
“updated” confidence condition, which provided the system confidence levels for the
current task and the previous 4 trials
The number of errors participants made on the primary task was twice as many in
the fixed (overall reliability only) condition than in the updated conditions, meaning that
trust was better calibrated when participants received system confidence information on a
trial by trial basis. Participants were also more likely to misuse the automated system
(i.e., comply with the automation when they shouldn’t) in the fixed condition, especially
in the high task load trials. In addition, providing system confidence information led to
less anchoring to the initial advice provided by the automation and more appropriate
compliance (e.g., rejecting the advice when it’s wrong after checking the information
panel for additional information). Thus, automation bias (only seeking information that
supports the advice provided by the automation) was reduced when system confidence
information was provided. Because participants were able to use process information
(i.e., system confidence), rather than performance information (i.e., overall reliability),
these results suggest the possibility of a greater influence of dispositional trust rather than
history-based trust.
Participants also monitored the panel for equipment failure, which occurred once
per session. All equipment failure occurrences were missed across all conditions. The
authors interpret this result positively, suggesting that providing system confidence did
not pose an additional attention burden. However, another possible interpretation is that if
there was a floor effect in both conditions; that is, all occurrences were missed there is no
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way to determine the level of attentional burden of any of the displays. Thus, it cannot be
determined that the display did not require more attention to process the additional
information as compared to not providing it. Facilitating more automatic processing of
information by providing an additional display could allow participants to devote more
remaining attention to the monitoring task. Thus, in this study, attentional demand of
displays of system confidence will also be measured.
In a similar study, it was found that system confidence information allowed users
to better gauge when to trust or distrust automation, and the anthropomorphic feature of
pedigree (i.e., expertise) amplified the effect. The study used a target detection task, also
with 4 levels of system confidence (75%, 50%, 25%, and unaided; Spain & Bliss, 2009).
The study also added the anthropomorphic feature of expertise to the automation and it
was hypothesized that people would trust an automated aid more when they believed the
system to be an expert system over a novice system, even though this was only in the
instructions, not actually manipulated within the automated system. This human-like
classification of knowledge ascribed to the DSS is an example of anthropomorphism or
the assignment of human like characteristics to automation. Participants in this study
trusted the expert system more than the novice system. As in social interactions, the
participants assumed the expert was more trustworthy than the novice system, a
perception that outweighed trust built on experience with using the system.
The display in Spain & Bliss (2009) study was different from the McGuirl &
Sarter study. Instead of an updating, dynamic line graph display, system confidence was
displayed using a bar graph (size of the bar mapped to the confidence level, i.e., 75%
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confidence had a bar ¾ filled in), the actual numerical value of the confidence level, and
the bar itself was color coded (i.e., the 75% was displayed in a red bar, 50% was
displayed with an orange bar, and 25% was displayed with a yellow bar). Compliance
was significantly higher in the 75% (high) confidence condition than in the 50% and 25%
conditions. Compliance was also greater in the high workload condition. When the
image quality was degraded (an example of a data-limited, not resource-limited task),
participants were more likely to appropriately comply with the automation when system
confidence was high, and rely on their own judgment when system confidence was low.
Limitations of past studies on system confidence
Several problems exist with the McGuirl & Sarter (2004) and Spain & Bliss
(2009) studies that may reduce the generalizability to other decision making scenarios.
The type of decision tasks that were used differ from the type of decisions a consumer
makes (e.g., finding the best prescription drug plan from a list of options). McGuirl &
Sarter (2006) used a scenario in which there was not a precisely correct answer (e.g.,
different combinations of controls could produce a safe situation) and Spain & Bliss
(2009) used a binary decision task. Neither studies had any trials in which the automation
produced false alarms (i.e., there were never trials that said there wasn’t a target when in
fact there was).
Another limitation is that the motivations and strategies decision makers rely on
may be different for different types of decision tasks. The risk of making an incorrect
decision would have resulted in a direct loss of human life in both previous studies (i.e.,
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crashing a plane or not detecting an enemy target), unlike the consequences involved in
choosing a product or service (e.g., choosing a drug plan).
Spain & Bliss (2009) may have also confounded system reliability with system
confidence. System confidence is not based on the number of trials presented over time
like reliability is (i.e., percent accurate). Instead, system confidence is an estimation of
how well the system believes the input information for one trial or scenario fits the
algorithms that it is basing its decision on. Spain & Bliss describe their manipulation of
system confidence as: “Each participant received 24 high confidence, 24 neutral
confidence, 24 low confidence trials, and 24 no aid trials. In these four conditions, the
base rate of a target being present was .75, .50, .25, and .50 respectively” (p. 345).
System confidence in this study was coupled with reliability because the base rate of the
target being present was positively correlated with actual performance of the DSS.
Whenever the system confidence was high, reliability and thus performance was also
high. McGuirl & Sarter’s (2004) manipulation is less clearly defined.
In a perfect system, the system confidence would be equated to how accurate the
system is. It would be advantageous to test whether users base their trust on system
confidence when confidence is high, but the DSS suggestion is inaccurate or unreliable or
vice versa. In the cases where overall reliability is low, yet the system is 75% confident in
its suggestion, will users trust the system? Can users differentiate between reliability and
system confidence in a situation where there are some “good” answers and one “best”
answer? This is a highly likely scenario when there are options that only vary slightly, or
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in situations where an algorithm isn’t able to distinguish between qualitative differences
between options.
When system confidence was low, participants were less likely to comply with
the system, thus having to allocate resources to the decision task (Spain & Bliss, 2009;
McGuirl & Sarter, 2004). Adding information to an already resource-limited task may not
help performance. The display could be designed to minimize the resources needed to
process the additional system confidence information. The two studies above only
looked at numerical system confidence and a trend line display. It is important to note
that in face-to-face interactions with humans (and without DSS), confidence is not
assessed numerically.
Reducing processing through display design
There is a body of research that provides insight into how to display numerical
information to make it easier to process. For example, bar graphs are superior for tasks
that require comparisons or for discriminating discrete differences in dependent variables
over different levels of independent variables (Gillan et al., 1988). Line graphs have
been shown to help people determine trends and patterns in data over time, whereas pie
charts are recommended for showing proportions or percentages. Tables are superior
when the task requires an accurate extraction of a single, absolute value (Meyer, Shinar,
& Leiser, 1997). Color can be used for identifying levels of a variable (Breslow,
Ratwani, & Trafton, 2009). Hybrids of these graphs (“grables”) combine numerical
values as well as visualizations through perceptual features such as bar graphs, line
graphs, and pie charts (Zacks & Tversky, 1999). Bar grables, line grables, and pie grables
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have been shown to be superior to any of the perceptual visualizations alone, across a
broad range of integration and extraction tasks (Zacks & Tversky, 1999).
One explanation for the beneficial effects of visualizations is that they rely on
humans’ relatively automaticity at extracting perceptual features (Lohse, 1997; Breslow,
Ratwani, & Trafton, 2009). Instead of trying to determine the trend over time or across
variables using a table, the integration is displayed via size comparisons (bar and pie
charts) or pattern direction (line charts). Tasks that require integration require working
memory, a limited resource. The perception of color and size do not require effortful
processing when they are used for a task that requires identification (color) or
comparisons (size). However, it may be more difficult for decision makers to associate
positive and negative valences because that is an artificial mapping of valence to size and
color. Context is required to assign valence to these manipulations, which may in itself
pose additional workload (e.g., to know if red = “bad” or “good”).
Affect As Information Theory and Automatic Processing
Another way to affect one’s trust in automation is to replace quantitative
information with emotional information that leads to changes in trust behavior. That is,
to encode quantitative information into the qualitative presentation of an emotion or
affect. According to Slovic, Funicane, Peters, and MacGregor (2003), affect is the
“goodness” or “badness” quality experienced as a feeling state (with or without
consciousness) and determines the positive or negative qualities of a stimulus. Like
perceptual features, affective stimuli are processed without attention and are likely to
influence behavior whether the decision maker intends it to or not (Lee, 2006).
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Emotional stimuli are thought to be processed automatically but separately from nonemotional stimuli (Ohman & Mineka, 2001), and engage different brain structures (Lee,
2006). Lee (2006; Lee & See, 2004) suggests that affect may play a major role in
judgments and decision making due to the pre-attentive nature of affective processing.
Evidence of this phenomenon include patients with specific brain lesions that maintain
their reasoning abilities and cognitive functions (e.g., working memory), but have
impaired emotions and decision making ability (Lee, 2006; Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio,
1990).
Peters, et al. (2009) found that the presence of evaluative categories, or positively
and negatively valenced categories in addition to numerical information helped decision
makers make better use of the numerical information because they invoked feelings of
goodness and badness. Decision makers that score low in numeracy, or the ability to draw
meaning from numbers, may benefit the most from affective cues such as positively and
negatively valenced labels. In the context of system confidence, it may be difficult for
decision makers to associate a numeric value or percentage with a social emotion such as
confidence without some form of affective cue. The findings of Peter et al., suggest that
the simple manipulation of associating good (positive) and bad (negative) feelings with
numbers, such as system confidence level, may be enough to invoke an affective
response that leads to better judgments as to whether or not to trust an automated DSS on
a trial by trial basis.
One way in which emotions can guide judgments is in the example of
trustworthiness. Judgments of trustworthinesss are also processed without attention.

19

Evidence from fMRI studies have shown different patterns of activation in the brain
when judging trustworthiness of a face versus basic emotions of anger, sadness, or fear
(Winston, Strange, O’Doherty, & Dolan, 2002). When participants rate the
trustworthiness of faces, they reliably rate positive emotions such as happiness, as more
trustworthy and negative emotions (e.g., anger, fear, sadness) as less trustworthy
(Todorov, 2008). Information derived from facial emotions about trustworthiness can
guide avoidance and acceptance behaviors (Todorov, 2008).
Different types of displays may affect trust differentially. In both the McGuirl &
Sarter (2004) and Spain & Bliss (2009) studies, additional information regarding the
system’s confidence was provided in a numerical and graphic display. The additional
information may have required more processing and attention. For example, in Spain &
Bliss (2009) the color indications could be misconstrued. Red was used to symbolize the
danger of a target being present while green was used to symbolize no danger due to the
absence of a target. In a task where a target being present presents a positive outcome,
the color mappings would need to be switched, such that green means less danger than
red. It may require attention to understand these mappings and apply positive and
negative valences to the given system confidence number. The same may be true for the
size comparisons.
Facial expressions may be a better way to provide information such as system
confidence information because users process emotions from facial expressions
automatically. Furthermore, anthropomorphic features, or the application of human traits
to computers (automation), have been shown to influence trust in situations where the
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only difference was the added human-like features (e.g., Gong, 2008). For example,
adding the face of a smiling doctor to a diabetes decision support system increased trust
when compared to a text only condition (Pak, Fink, Price, Bass, & Sturre, 2012). The
match between the emotional construct of trust and the mode in which people are well
adapted to read confidence and trust – faces, may provide the least attention demanding,
yet most influential means of influencing trust.
Encoding System Confidence Values within Faces
Reliably conveying the system confidence through computerized facial displays
(i.e., not photographed faces) has been a major hurdle in the design of interactive
systems, especially when the use of an avatar is present (e.g., Oh & Stone, 2007;
Takeuchi & Nagao, 1993; Walker, Sproull, & Subramani, 1994). These studies show that
anthropomorphic features of a conversational agent, such as body language, intonation,
and differences facial features are all needed to relay the automation’s confidence. In
addition to the difficulty of applying self-confidence to a DSS, implementing an
interactive, conversational type of system may be impractical for companies to provide to
consumers, as well as unnecessary if a more simple solution exists. Instead, relying on
valence through the use of static faces with negative and positive emotional expressions
may be a much less complicated and less expensive way to relay the same information.
People are well adapted to interpret basic emotions from faces; that is, people
reliably and consistently are able to identify emotions such as sadness, happiness, anger,
fear, and disgust from facial expressions (Ortony & Turner, 1990). Ekman (1999)
theorized that because these emotions are tied to changes in physiology (e.g., differences
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in heart rate variability, skin conductance, etc.), these emotions help people anticipate
future events in an uncertain world where fight or flight responses determine survival.
Similarly, the facial expressions that convey trust or confidence may help decision
makers anticipate whether they should trust the DSS automatically, using the affect-asinformation heuristic when system confidence is displayed via facial expressions.
One of the first direct uses of facial affect to convey quantitative information was
Chernoff faces (Chernoff, 1973). Chernoff faces map multi-variate data to specific facial
features (i.e., size of the eyes, mouth, or nose, Chernoff, 1973). Further evidence showed
that people were sensitive to intensities of different emotions of Chernoff faces (Hess,
Blairy, & Kleck, 1997). When the intensity of the emotion is high, people rate that face
higher on a scale of emotion. Thus, people should be able to distinguish differences in
system confidence based on the type of emotion (e.g., sadness, happiness, or neutral) and
intensity (e.g., 25%, 75%).
Will System Confidence Displayed As Facial Expressions Improve Trust
Calibration?
The aim of the current studies was to examine whether an anthropomorphic
display (i.e., facial expressions) of system confidence can improve trust and trust
calibration. In review, our assumptions based on the literature are that 1) emotions
(presented by variously valenced facial images) are processed automatically, 2) people
can detect fine intensity differences between levels of facial emotion, and 3) presenting
system confidence information helps calibrate trust in automation.
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If system confidence information can be extracted automatically from facial
expressions in the form of emotions and affect (i.e., feelings of goodness or badness),
then it should be more influential on trust than a non-affective display. Evidence of less
mistrust and distrust would indicate better calibration and faster reaction times would
indicate more automatic processing of system confidence information.
A secondary aim of the current study was to examine whether based their trust on
the DSS on system confidence or reliability. In previous studies, the relationship
between system confidence and actual reliability was positively correlated.
Unfortunately, this may not always be true because system confidence is a separate
construct based on the information being input to the DSS, not on the actual reliability of
the system. This study uncoupled system confidence from reliability and examined
whether users base their trust on reliability or on the system confidence information. It
was expected that participants would be able to perceive the differences between the
coupled and uncoupled system confidence-reliability conditions and only rely on system
confidence when it was indeed mapped (coupled) to reliability. However, adding
anthropomorphic features to automation has been shown to artificially inflate trust in
some studies (e.g., Spain & Bliss, 2009; Gong, 2004), thus it is imperative to test whether
adding an anthropomorphic faces display can be perceived correctly or whether this type
of display will artificially inflate trust.
Overview of the Current Studies
The purpose of study 1 is to determine the attentional demand of extracting a
confidence value from different displays and determined which 1 of the 3 perceptual
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display conditions (i.e., bar chart, pie chart, or color conditions) was used in study 2.
Additionally, results were used to determine if numerical system confidence information
should also be included in these conditions. This study did not directly answer the
question of whether an anthropomorphic display of system confidence will influence
trust. Instead, its purpose was to assess the relative attentional demands of affective
displays compared to the other, more conventional data display conditions.
The second study examined the effects of different displays of system confidence
and the effects of coupling and uncoupling system confidence with reliability information
on trust and compliance with a DSS in the context of choosing a prescription drug plan
from a table of 15 options. Trust, accuracy, and reaction time was used to measure trust
calibration.
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STUDY 1: ATTENTIONAL DEMAND OF TYPES OF DISPLAYS

METHODS
Participants
Thirty younger adults aged 18 to 23 were recruited from the Clemson Human
Participants in Research (HPR) system and received course credit for participation.
Groups of 1 to 7 participants were tested simultaneously; however participants worked
independently at separate workstations. The only exclusion criteria for participation were
the presence of color-blindness and the inability to read a computer screen.
Demographic information (e.g., age, gender, education) was collected along with
several computerized ability tests measuring perceptual speed (Digit Symbol
Substitution; Weschler, 1997), working memory (Reverse Digit Span; Weschler, 1997);
spatial orientation (Cube Comparison; Ekstrom, French, Harmon, & Dermen, 1976),
spatial visualization (Paper Folding; Ekstrom, et al., 1976), and crystallized intelligence
(Shipley Vocabulary Test; Shipley, 1986). These tests were used to identify any
participants whose performance may be abnormal due to sub-average abilities, thus
potentially affecting the accuracy of results of the between groups variable of display
type.
Design
This study was an 11 (system confidence display type) x 2 (task load: single,
dual) within subjects design. Three levels of system confidence were tested (low, 25%;
neutral, 50%; and high, 75%). System confidence display type included six displays of
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system confidence (i.e., number, bar, pie, color, evaluative categories (eval-cats), and
anthropomorphic faces (anthro-face)). For all levels except the number condition, the
image was shown with and without the numerical system confidence value (e.g., the bar
graph condition will be shown with the 25% value and without 25%), resulting in 5
displays without numerical information (i.e., bar, pie, color, evaluative categories, and
anthro-face) and 6 displays with numerical information (i.e., number, bar, pie, color,
evaluative categories, and anthro-face). The purpose of this manipulation was to
determine if the perceptual features of the display (i.e., graph, size, or color) require less
attention to identify system confidence level. Attention was measured by participants’
response time on the graphic identification task under high workload conditions.
Procedure
Participants performed both a primary task (graphic level identification with the
system confidence displays) and secondary task (playing a block game similar to the
game Tetris). Experimenters gave participants a paper copy of each display condition
(see Appendix A) that displayed all levels of confidence before moving on to the actual
experiment. Participants first performed the block game task until they reached a score
of 50. Next, they performed the graphic level identification task. Finally, they performed
the tasks together. Participants were told to prioritize the block game task and perform
the graphic level identification task with any reserve attention. The purpose was to make
sure that participants were engaged in the block game task throughout the experiment.
The full protocol can be found in Appendix B.
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Tasks
Graphic identification task (primary task)
The primary task was to identify the level of the system confidence of the graphic
displayed on the computer screen. Each system confidence display graphic had 3 levels:
25%, 50%, and 75%. These graphics were displayed on the right hand side of the
computer screen in a designated box with a resolution of 340 x 410 pixels. Participants
rated the images using the numeric keys with the following mapping: 1 =25%, 2= 50%,
and 3=75%.
Block matching task (secondary task)
The block matching task was the secondary task because it was designed to place
a constant attentional burden in the dual-task condition (Fisk, Derrick, & Schneider,
1986). Participants used the arrow keys (i.e., up, down, left, right) to match 3 blocks
vertically or horizontally to gain points. Blocks could be switched horizontally (but not
vertically) using the space bar. When 3 blocks of the same color were matched, they
disappeared, similar to the game of Tetris. Blocks moved at a rate of 1 pixel every 100
ms. The goal of this task was to keep participants engaged in a secondary task that
requires continuous attention and that would be difficult to automatized (Fisk, Derrick, &
Schneider, 1986).
Participants completed a total of 66 trials. Two trials for each level of system
confidence (3: 25%, 50%, 75%), in each of the 11 display type conditions (number only +
6 display types a(x2: with number/without number). Trials were displayed in random
order and at random time intervals between 30 and 40 seconds to prevent subjects from
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anticipating the image in the dual task condition. It was not feasible to increase the
number of trials due to the high number of displays being tested. Displaying the images
twice at intervals of 30-40 seconds requires 45 minutes. Participants will also do this task
twice, once in the single task condition and again in the dual task condition. Thus the
time required to complete both of these tasks together (and not including the block
matching task or the demographics) is 1hr 30min.
Independent Variables
System confidence displays and level of confidence
Six levels of system confidence displays were assessed in this first study. Each
one is described in more detail and pictured below. The same 3 levels of system
confidence were used as in the Spain & Bliss (2009) study: 25%, 50%, and 75%. These
levels are equally spaced apart (25%) and the disparity was large enough to discriminate
between levels. The 50% condition was chosen as the neutral point because it indicates
that the system is equally confident as it is unconfident.
Condition 1: Numerical percentage baseline condition (Number)
In this condition, just the numerical display of system confidence was presented
(see Figure 3 for the display at all 3 levels of system confidence). Tasks that require
extraction of specific numerical quantities are best supported with a table to prevent
misinterpretation of absolute values (Hink, Wogalter, & Eustace, 1996; Tufte, 1983). The
size of the display is 134 x 70 pixels.
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Figure 3. Number Condition.
Condition 2: Bar chart display (Bar and nBar)
The bar graph display was chosen because it provides a perceptual comparison of
area that may be associated with the proportion (i.e., percentage) of system confidence.
Bar graphs are typically most useful when displaying differences between some
dependent variable over levels of an independent variable (Gillan, et al., 1998). There is
only one level being shown at each time, rather than a discrete comparison between data
points, which is what people are typically used to associating with bar graphs (Zacks, &
Tversky, 1999). It is unclear whether the area comparison within one bar display will be
discernible enough to obtain an absolute value of confidence, without the number. As a
comparison, a second condition (see Figure 4 for both displays) that includes both the
scaled gray bar with appropriate proportional area covered (i.e., 25%, 50%, & 75%) will
be shown with the number.
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Bar with numerical System
Bar Only (Bar)
Confidence (nBar)
25%
50%

75%

Figure 4. Bar and Numerical Bar Conditions.
Condition 3: Pie Chart Display (Pie and nPie)
A pie chart condition was chosen because performance has been shown to
improve when a pie chart is used to represent proportionate values (e.g., percentages)
(Gillan et al., 1998). Similar to the condition above, including the numerical quantity
allows a comparison between conditions to examine if there is a significant difference
when the number is included with the perceptual comparison. Previous research has also
suggested that hybrid displays of pie charts that include the table values (i.e., a pie
“grable”) produces significantly more accurate results than just the pie chart itself when
the goal is to extract an absolute value (Hink, Wogalter, & Eustace, 1996). The pie charts
shown are smaller in Figure 5 than the actual size displayed (~274x268 pixels).
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25%

50%

75%

Pie Chart

Pie Chart with
numerical system
confidence
(nPie)
Figure 5. Pie and Numerical Pie conditions.
Condition 4: Color Display (Color and nColor)
The color display condition uses a multi-colored heat map scale to indicate the
level of confidence (Figure 6). Breslow, Ratwani, & Trafton (2009) found that when the
task requires the identification or extraction of an absolute value, using a multi-colored
scale can facilitate identification. The task used in that study involved finding the color
in a legend, then finding a region on a map. The task in this study requires the
identification of a proportionate confidence level. Thus, this condition was included to
examine whether the benefits of a multi-colored heat map can be extended to an
extraction task where the subject knows that they only have 3 options to rate the level of
confidence.
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25%

50%

75%

Color

Color with
numerical
system
confidence
Figure 6. Color and Numerical Color Conditions.
Condition 5: Evaluative Categories Display (EvalCat and nEvalCat)
Evaluative categories can add meaning to numerical data by invoking an affective
response that can improve decision making, especially for those low in numeracy (Peters,
et al., 2009). Three labels were created with boundary lines similar to the Peters, et al.
(2009) study to help participants decide whether to trust the system (see Figure 7).

Evaluative Categories

Evaluative Categories with numerical
system confidence (nEvalCat)

25%

50%

75%

Figure 7. Evaluative Categories and Numerical Evaluative Categories Conditions.
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Condition 6: Anthropomorphic Display (Anthro and nAnthro)
Chernoff faces were created using the statistical package R (Figure 8). A wide
range of emotion was chosen to maximize the discriminability between confidence
conditions. For the 25% condition, the emotion of sad was chosen because it is one of the
six emotions that people are able to best recognize and because it should evoke a
negatively valenced affect. The 50% or neutral condition is the same for both happy and
sad, so this was chosen as the midpoint. The 75% happy and 100% happy faces were
chosen to represent high system confidence.

25%

50%

75%

Anthropomorphic

Anthropomorphic
with numerical
system confidence
display

Figure 8. Anthropomorphic display and Numerical Anthropomorphic Conditions.
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Dependent variables
Graphic identification accuracy
Accuracy on the graph identification task was a binary measure, either correct or
incorrect. Correct scores indicate that participants pressed the correct number key
associated with the image’s confidence level (where1=25%, 2=50%, & 3=75%).
Graphic level identification time
Graphic identification time was recorded in milliseconds from the time the
graphic appeared to the time the participant pressed the number key to make a rating.
Faster reaction times indicate lesser attentional demands.
Block game score
A block game score was assessed by the program automatically by recording 1
point when 3 blocks are successfully matched and cleared. A total score was then
calculated. The score was used to screen out participants who were not engaged in both
tasks, defined as scores below 3 standard deviations from the mean.
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RESULTS
Thirty participants (15 female, 15 male) between the ages of 19-27 (M=23.43,
SD=2.74) participated in study 1. Participant characteristics are included in Table 1.
Unfortunately, scores for the spatial visualization (paper folding) and spatial orientation
(cube comparison) were not recorded for 3 subjects, thus only 27 subjects are included in
the reported means and standard deviations for those abilities tests.
One subject was dropped from the performance analyses because of computer
malfunction. The remaining 29 subjects were included in the remainder of the analyses.
Table 1.
Study 1 Participant Descriptives
Category
Age1
Spatial Visualization (Paper Folding)2
Spatial Orientation (Cube Comparison)2
Working Memory (Reverse Digit Span)1
Perceptual Speed (Digit Symbol Substitution)1
Vocabulary (Shipley)1
Note: 1N=29; 2N=27.

M
23.43
23.04
24.56
7.73
96%
29.43

SD
2.74
2.59
9.29
2.8
8.9%
4.28

Block Game Task Score: A Manipulation Check of Attentional Load
The predetermined criterion for exclusion from analyses was a score below 3
standard deviations from the mean on the block game task. It could be assumed that
these participants were not following instruction or were not devoting attention to the
task. The mean block game score in the dual task condition was a score of 88.7 (blocks
cleared) and the standard deviation was 22.06, and thus the criterion for exclusion was a
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score of 22.52. The lowest score on this task was 49, well above the exclusion criterion
so all remaining 29 subjects were included in the analyses.
Attentional Demand of System Confidence Displays
An 11 (system confidence display type) x 2 (single task vs. dual task) within
subjects ANOVA was used to analyze task time and accuracy on the graphic
identification task. The purpose of this analysis was to identify the graphic display (e.g.,
Bar, Pie, and Color) that required the least amount of time (as a measure of attention) to
identify the system confidence level. The condition that required the least amount of
attention was then used in study 2. The purpose of including the other displays was to
provide relative attentional differences between conditions as a possible explanation for
performance differences in study 2. For example, if differences are found in attentional
load between displays, these results may help explain performance differences in study 2.
Task time
For task time, there were significant main effects of task type (F(10, 24)=50.72,
p<.000, ηp2 =.68) and display type (F(10, 240)=6.77, p<.000, ηp2=.22). Task type (single
vs. dual task) also significantly interacted with the display type on task time (F(10,
240)=3.04, p=.001, ηp2=.11). Task time was measured in seconds, thus all means and
standard deviations are presented in seconds.
A Post-hoc Bonferroni analysis revealed 13 significant differences between the 11
display conditions in the single task condition and these are summarized in Table 2 and
presented in Figure 9. The purpose of study 1 was to determine which of the graph
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conditions should be used in study 2, thus these are the only differences that will be
discussed in-text because of the high number of differences found in study 1.

Table 2.
Significant Post-hoc Comparisons for Task Time (seconds)
Display
Display
Type
M
SD
Direction
Type
M
Single Task (n=29)
Bar
nBar
nPie
nPie
nPie
Color
EvalCat
EvalCat
EvalCat
nEvalCat
nEvalCat
nEvalCat
nEvalCat

1.04
1.03
1.09
1.09
1.09
1.52
1.12
1.12
1.12
1.06
1.06
1.06
1.06

0.34
0.32
0.49
0.49
0.49
0.42
0.35
0.35
0.35
0.34
0.34
0.34
0.34

nPie
nPie
nPie

1.08
1.60
1.60

0.10
0.08
0.08

Faster
Color
Faster
Anthro
Faster
Color
Faster
Anthro
Faster
NAnthro
Faster
Number
Faster
Color
Faster
Pie
Faster
Anthro
Faster
Color
Faster
Pie
Faster
Anthro
Faster
NAnthro
Dual Task (n=29)
Faster
Faster
Faster

Pie
nEvalCat
Anthro

SD

p

1.52
1.40
1.52
1.40
1.23
1.12
1.52
1.32
1.40
1.52
1.32
1.40
1.23

0.42
0.43
0.42
0.43
0.50
0.48
0.42
0.43
0.43
0.42
0.43
0.43
0.50

.007
.001
.005
.045
.013
.001
.000
.004
.000
.000
.006
.000
.050

1.98
2.01
1.90

0.08
0.11
0.09

.003
.018
.013

For the single task condition, the Color condition (M=1.52, SD=.42) was
significantly slower than the Bar condition (M=1.12, SD=.45, p=.007), nBar condition
(M=1.03, SD=.32, p<.000), and nPie condition (M=1.09, SD=.49, p=.005). In the dual
task condition, nPie was faster (M=1.6, SD=419.8933) than Pie (M=1.98, SD=.08),
p=.003. The nPie condition was also the only graph display that was significantly faster
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than affective conditions, nEvalCat (M=2.01, SD=.11, p=.018) and Anthro (M=1.9,
SD=.09, p=.013).

Figure 9. Mean task time by system confidence display condition (in seconds). Error
bars represent standard error of the mean, N=29.
Accuracy
Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated for
display type (χ2 (54) = 91.76, p < .001) and the interaction between task type and display
type (χ2 (54) = 78.86, p < .019). Degrees of freedom were corrected using Huynh-Feldt
estimates of sphericity for these two analyses (display type, ε = .822; Task Type by
Display Type, ε = .894) (Huynh & Feldt, 1976). Task type did not violate the assumption
of sphericity, thus the sphericity assumed values are reported.
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There were significant main effects of task type (F(1, 24)=28.41, p<.000, ηp2
=.54) and display type (F(8.22, 197.26)=4.82, p<.000, ηp2 =.17). Additionally, there was
a significant interaction between task type and display type (F(8.94, 214.56)=2.12, p=.03,
ηp2 =.08). A Post hoc Bonferroni analysis indicated that there were no differences
between single and dual task accuracy in the Pie condition (single – M=5.64, SD=.17;
dual –M=4.56, SD=.27), Color condition (single – M=5.08, SD=.29; dual –M=4.52,
SD=.25), and nColor condition (single – M=5.64, SD=.18; dual –M=5.36, SD=.18). The
remaining 8 display conditions showed a significant reduction in accuracy with the
addition of the block task compared to the single task condition (p<.05). These results are
graphed in Figure 10.
In the single task conditions, the Number display (M=5.86, SD=.44) and EvalCat
display (M=5.83, SD=.76) were significantly more accurate than the Pie display condition
(M=5.21, SD=1.01). However, in the dual task conditions the nColor display (M=4.79,
SD=1.68) was significantly more accurate than the Bar display (M=4.07, SD=1.88),
Anthro display (M=4.26, SD=1.39), and Color display (M=4.14, SD=1.58).
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Figure 10. Mean accuracy score by system confidence display condition. Error bars
represent standard error of the mean, N=29.
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DISCUSSION
The purpose of study 1 was to identify which of the graph conditions (i.e., Pie,
nPie, Color, nColor, Bar, or nBar) commanded the least amount of attention under high
workload and should be brought forward in study 2. The remaining conditions were
included to determine if there were major differences in including or excluding the
numerical value of system confidence (e.g., 25%) in the conditions that this could be
excluded. Additional information may require more attention and thus reduce
performance-based measures such as task time. Attentional load was determined using
task response time, however accuracy was also measured.
In the dual task condition, there were no significant differences in response time
between the graph conditions. The task itself was relatively simple and did not require
the user to comprehend meaning of the system confidence value, just rate it between 1, 2,
or 3. However, in the high workload condition, nPie display was faster than the affective
conditions nEvalCat and Anthro. Interestingly, when the number was not included with
the Pie display accuracy was unaffected by the addition of the block matching task. The
combination of quicker response times and lack of diminishing accuracy as workload
increased determined that the nPie condition would be brought forward.
Ironically performance did not improve when numerical confidence rating was
included in the graphic. This finding indicates that the additional information may not be
necessary in determining the value of system confidence; the graphic alone was enough
to convey numerical meaning. Peters, et al. (2009) found that evaluative categories
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improved performance when used in conjunction with a number and a graph and the
results of this study gave no indication that the display should be minimized by not
displaying the numerical system confidence value. Thus, the nEvalCat display was used
in study 2, as opposed to the EvalCat display (without the number). The Anthro display
was used in study 2 without the numerical information because the results of study 1
indicate that participants are able to distinguish differences between the faces without the
numerical value. The numerical values were not included because it would be more
difficult to conclude from the results that the processing of affect from the face display is
influencing trust or if participants are also using the numerical value. The idea was that
completely separating the two – numerical information from affective information –
would better test the hypothesis that affective information would have a greater influence
on trust behavior.
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STUDY 2: EFFECTS OF TYPE OF SYSTEM CONFIDENCE DISPLAY
ON TRUST AND PERFORMANCE
The purpose of study 2 was to examine the effect of an anthropomorphic face
display of system confidence on trust behavior compared to more traditional displays. In
study 2, the effects of 5 different types of system confidence displays on trust and
performance with a DSS was examined in a prescription drug plan decision context.
Three levels of system confidence were examined, low (25%), neutral (50%), and high
(75%), similar to previous studies examining system confidence (i.e., McGuirl & Sarter,
2006; Spain & Bliss, 2009). An additional focus of this study was to answer the question
of whether participants will use system confidence information in the same manner when
it is not positively correlated with reliability. If no differences in trust are found when
system confidence is coupled versus uncoupled with reliability, it may indicate that the
additional system confidence information is not beneficial over providing reliability
information.
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METHODS
Participants
One hundred younger adults ages 18 through 27 were recruited through flyers,
advertisements, and through the Clemson University Sona Systems Participant Pool
website. Participants were able to choose from one of the following incentives for
participation: 1) enter a drawing for an 8GB iPod Nano, 2) earn $10, or 3) extra credit in
a psychology course. The only exclusion criterion was the presence of color blindness
(self-reported).
Design
The study was a 4 +1 (system confidence display: none (control), number, nPie
(from study 1), evaluative categories, anthropomorphic) x 3 (system confidence level:
25%, 50%, & 75%) x 2 (reliability-confidence relationship: coupled, uncoupled) mixed
factorial design. System confidence display type was a between subjects variable, system
confidence level and reliability-confidence relationship were within subjects variables.
Each participant completed 60 trials of a decision-making task over two blocks
that were counterbalanced between participants. One block contained 30 trials with
uncoupled reliability-system confidence, with 10 trials at each of the 3 levels of system
confidence. The other block contained 30 trials with coupled reliability-system
confidence, also with 10 trials at all 3 levels of system confidence. In a previous study
(Pak, et al., 2012), the automated aid did not fail for the first 8 trials, which was sufficient
for participants to build trust in the system (i.e., not immediately discount its advice).
Aid failures were placed randomly on the remaining 22 trials. Similar to previous
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findings (Sanchez, 2006; Pak, et al., 2012), trust did not diminish after failure and instead
recovered with the first aid success.
Decision Task
Participants had to choose a prescription drug plan from a table with 15 plan
options and 4 attributes (see Figure 11). The table with the plan data had the same 4
attributes (i.e., monthy premium, annual deductible, gap coverage, and satisfaction rating)
used in Price & Pak (accepted). Additionally, the question contained criteria that the plan
had to meet. For example, one question read, “Which plan has the most gap coverage, a
monthly premium under $325, and the lowest annual deductible?” One plan option met
all of the criteria, 5 plans will met 2 of the 3 criteria, 5 plans met 1 out of the 3 criteria
and 4 met none of the criteria. The table and attributes were explained to participants at
the beginning of the experiment, and they will be given a sheet of paper which the
definitions of each of the attributes (e.g., gap coverage, summary rating, see Appendix C)
to refer back to during the experiment. These were also read aloud by the experimenter
and participants were given the opportunity to ask questions specifically about these
terms before moving on. This method of explaining the task was identical to that of the
table condition in Price & Pak (accepted).
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Figure 11. Example of plan data.
Figure 12 shows a screen shot of the program that was used for the decision task.
In all conditions, participants were shown a screen with the plan table on the left, the
question below the plan table, and a timer bar that counted down 45 seconds. The DSS
suggested plan was be displayed on the right of the screen, with the options to agree,
disagree, or peek below it. The plan suggestion was presented as “Plan X”, in an effort to
avoid confounding features of language that may influence trust. The system confidence
display was on the right above the DSS’ suggested plan in all conditions except for the no
system confidence condition. An overall score bar was placed above the system
confidence display (on the top right) which increased as participants answered questions
both quickly and correctly.
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Figure 12. Experiment screen in the anthropomorphic faces condition. The plan table is
in the upper left, with the question below it, and the timer bar at the bottom left. The
DSS system confidence display is on the upper right, with the DSS’ suggested plan below
it. Options to agree, disagree, or peek are on the lower right. The overall score is in the
upper right.
The participant could choose to agree, disagree, or peek at other options. If the
participant disagreed, the participant had to choose 1 of 4 possible answers (see Figure
13). Participants were told that the 4 answers are other possible answers that could be
correct. In pilot testing and a previous study (Price & Pak, accepted), participants did not
have sufficient time to do the task on their own, so providing all answers would make the
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task impossible. Furthermore, the main focus of this study is on trust of automation, so
once the user decided to disagree or peek and disagree, whether they solved the problem
accurately on their own was not of particular interest in this study.

Figure 13. Experiment screen when the user chooses “Disagree”.
The same 4 answers were displayed if the user clicked the peek button but were
not selectable (see Figure 14). The participant still had to choose agree or disagree after
peeking. After the participant selected an answer, they rated their trust in the DSS and
their confidence in their answer (Figure 15), and then received feedback on whether their
answer was correct or incorrect (see Figure 16).
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Figure 14. Experiment screen when the user chooses “Peek”.

Figure 15. Trust and confidence scales after each trial.
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Figure 16. Feedback screen after each trial.

Procedure
After reading the informational letter, participants completed the propensity to
trust survey and the insurance experience questionnaire. Participants were then told that
their job was to find the best prescription drug plan based on the criteria in the question,
using the aid. Participants were told that they were using two different systems, system
A and system B but were not explicitly told the difference in reliability-system
confidence relationship between the two systems (or blocks). Participants were informed
that both systems were mostly reliable, but no other explanation was given. Next, the
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experimenter oriented participants to the computer program and explained the decision
task through 3 practice trials in which they agreed, disagreed or peeked to answer the
question. Once participants no longer had questions, they began the first block of 30
trials. After completing block one, the experimenter started block two.
For each trial, participants were shown the question, the plan table, and the DSS.
The timer bar began counting down 45 seconds as soon as the question was presented.
Once the participant responded, the decision task screen disappeared and participants
rated their trust in the DSS and their confidence in their own answer. The decision task
screen then reappeared and provided feedback on the correctness of their answer.
At the conclusion of the decision task, participants completed computerized
versions of a demographics questionnaire and abilities tests. The protocol for study 2 is
in Appendix D.
Independent variables
Type of display (between subjects)
The 5 display types were 1) No system confidence (None), 2) Number, 3) Pie
Graph (Pie), 4) Evaluative Categories (EvalCat), and 5) Anthropomorphic faces (Anthro).
The None condition was analyzed as a control group to determine whether participants
were using system confidence information when it was provided.
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Reliability-System confidence coupling (within subjects)
We manipulated the extent to which reliability of the DSS and system confidence
reported by the DSS corresponded. When they did correspond, reliability of the system
was calculated such that system confidence was directly related to system reliability. For
example, in the 25% confidence display condition, the automation will be correct in its
advice for 25% of the trials and incorrect for 75% of the trials (see Table 3).
In the uncoupled condition, the relationship between actual reliability and
reported system confidence was not related; reliability was 67% in each of the 3
conditions (Table 3). The purpose of this manipulation was to examine whether
participants were using system confidence information and if it affected trust
independently from reliability information. An additional purpose of this manipulation
was to examine whether trust changes as a result from the mismatch in expectancy. This
variable was within subjects and conditions and was counterbalanced so that half of the
participants receive the coupled condition first, and the other half will receive the
uncoupled condition first. Participants were not informed about the overall reliability of
the system.
Table 3.
System Confidence and Reliability Manipulations
Actual System Reliability
System confidence level
Coupled
Uncoupled
25%
25% correct
67% correct
50%
50% correct
67% correct
75%
75% correct
67% correct
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System confidence (within subjects)
The same levels of confidence used in study 1 were used in study 2: 25% (low),
50% (neutral), and 75% (high). Experimenters explained system confidence as “a system
generated estimation of whether it is providing a correct suggestion that is based on the
quality of the information it (the system) is using to provide a suggestion, on a trial by
trial basis. If the system has low confidence, it is likely that it does not have much
information to help it make a decision, the information is degraded, or there are other
choices that are very similar and hard to choose between. If the system has high
confidence, it is likely that the system has plenty of good information and that one
prescription drug plan is much better than the others”.
Dependent Variables
Three categories of dependent measures were analyzed in this study: 1)
Participant characteristics (propensity to trust and insurance experience), 2) Trust and
dependence (behavioral trust, subjective trust, participants’ confidence in their answer),
and 3) Performance (decision accuracy and task time). Trust calibration was assessed by
comparing participants’ compliance with the DSS’s suggestion and actual system
accuracy (reliability), similar to the analysis of McGuirl & Sarter (2006). If compliance
was higher than actual system accuracy, this was considered mistrust (using the DSS
when one shouldn’t). If compliance was lower than actual system accuracy, this was
categorized as distrust (not using the DSS when one should).
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Propensity to trust
A measure of participants’ propensity to trust machines was chosen because of its
high correlation with dispositional trust and history-based trust (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990)
.The Complacency-Potential Rating Scale (CPRS) was developed by Singh, Molloy, &
Parasuraman (1993) and has four factors: Confidence-Related, Reliance-Related, TrustRelated, and Safety-Related complacency. The CPRS has high internal consistency (r
>.98) and test-retest reliability (r=.90) (Singh, et al., 1993). Participants rated each one of
the 20 items on a 5 point Likert scale from Strongly Agree to Strongly Disagree. The
CPRS was scored by adding up the scores for items 1-16 and excluding the last 4 filler
items.
Insurance purchasing experience
An insurance purchasing experience questionnaire used in Price & Pak (accepted)
was used to control for differences in insurance knowledge. The brief questionnaire asks
3 questions: 1) Have you ever purchased health insurance?, 2) If #1 is yes, how many
years of experience do you have purchasing health insurance, 3) Have you ever
purchased a prescription drug plan?, 4) If #3 is yes, how many years of experience do you
have purchasing prescription drug plans? The answer choices for questions 1 and 3 were
yes or no, and for 2 and 4 the answer choices were 1)Less than 6 months, 2) 6 months but
less than 1 year, 3) 1 year but less than 5 years, 4) 5 years but less than 10 years, 5) At
least 10 years.
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Trust and Performance Dependent Variables
Subjective trust
After each trial, participants answered the question, “How trustworthy is the
automation?” on a 7 point Likert scale used in Pak, Fink, Price, Bass, & Sturre (2012).
The end points of the Likert scale ranged from (1) Not at all trustworthy to (7)
Completely trustworthy.
Behavioral trust
In addition to subjective trust, an objective measure of trust will be based on
participants’ actual behavior with the DSS. This measure of behavioral trust was
significantly correlated with subjective trust (r=.35) in Pak, Fink, Price, Bass, & Sturre
(2012). Participants had the option of agreeing, disagreeing, or peeking at other
suggested answers. If participants unconditionally agreed with the DSS, this represented
high trust and was coded with a value of 4. If participants peeked and then agreed, this
represented an attitude of “trust but verify” and was coded with a value of 3. Peeking and
then disagreeing represented moderate distrust and was coded with a value of 2.
Immediately disagreeing with the DSS represented distrust and was coded with a value of
1.
Participants’ confidence in their decision
Participants also answered the question, “How confident are you in your answer?”
on 7 point Likert scale used in Pak, Fink, Price, Bass, & Sturre (2012) after each trial.
The end points of the Likert scale ranged from (1) not at all confident to (7) completely
confident. Previous literature shows that when trust exceeds confidence, participants’
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compliance with automation is much higher than when trust falls below confidence (Pak,
et al., 2012; Lee & Moray, 1992, 1994).
Trust calibration
Trust calibration was analyzed using a Pearson correlation between mean
behavioral trust and a created system reliability score. The system reliability score
matched the system reliability on the same 4 point scale as behavioral trust, such that
when system reliability was 25%, the appropriate behavioral trust score was equal to 1
(disagree with the system), 50% was 2.5 (either peek and disagree or peek and agree),
and 75% was 4 (agree with the system). The higher the correlation, the better calibration
there was between actual system reliability and behavioral trust.
Decision accuracy
Decision accuracy was a measure of decision performance. This was a binary
measure; either the participant chose the best answer (scored as 1) or they did not (scored
as 0). An overall accuracy score was computed by summing the number correct.
Task time
Task time was measured in seconds from the time the decision task was presented
until the time the participant indicates their decision. Task time was restricted to a
maximum of 45 seconds per question. In a previous study, Price & Pak (accepted) found
that for this task, younger subjects’ task time mean was 38.5 seconds (SD=2.87). The
time constraint was reduced for this study to impose a higher workload.
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HYPOTHESES
H1: A 3-way interaction was predicted such that in the low system confidence
condition (25%) and neutral system confidence condition (50%) but not in the high
system confidence condition (75%), subjective trust (DV) was higher in the
anthropomorphic faces and evaluative categories conditions than the other 3 conditions
(i.e., pie condition, number only condition, and no system confidence condition), but only
when system confidence was coupled with reliability. In the uncoupled condition, no
effect of system confidence level or system confidence display was expected.
H2. Higher correlations between system reliability and average behavioral trust are
predicted for participants in the faces and evaluative categories conditions, in comparison
to the non-affective conditions, but only when system confidence is coupled with
reliability. Participants in the affective conditions (i.e., faces and evaluative categories)
were expected to better trust the DSS’s system confidence value. In other words,
participants were expected to have a higher overall trust (subjective trust) in the DSS’s
ability to report an accurate system confidence value and would thus engage more often
in verification behavior (i.e., peeking or disagreeing with the DSS) when system
confidence was low (25% or neutral 50%). When system confidence was high,
participants would be more likely to comply (i.e., agree) with the DSS.

H3. A 3-way interaction was predicted such that in the low system confidence condition
(25%) and neutral system confidence condition (50%) but not the high confidence
condition (75%), decision accuracy (DV) would behigher in the anthropomorphic faces
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and evaluative categories conditions than the other 3 conditions (i.e., graph condition,
number only condition, and no system confidence conditions), but only when system
confidence was coupled with reliability. In the uncoupled condition, no effect of system
confidence level or system confidence display was expected. Participants in the affective
conditions (i.e., anthropomorphic faces and evaluative categories) were expected to have
higher overall subjective trust in the DSS. Similar to the justification of H3, participants
would trust that a low (25%) and neutral (50%) system confidence rating requires
verification and a high system confidence rating (75%) does not. If the user’s behavioral
trust is appropriately calibrated with system reliability (and if system reliability and
system confidence are coupled), then accuracy was expected to be higher.

H4: A main effect of system confidence display on task time (DV) was predicted such
that participants in the anthropomorphic faces condition will perform faster across all
levels of system confidence and system confidence-reliability relationship, followed by
the evaluative categories condition, graph condition, number only condition, and then the
no system confidence condition. This prediction was based on the differences in the
automaticity of processing feelings of trustworthiness between each of these conditions,
as explained in the introduction and independent variables section of study 1.
Furthermore, if users trusted the DSS and complied with its suggestion, there would not
be a time cost associated with verification behavior (i.e., peeking and checking other
answers).
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RESULTS
Participants
One-hundred younger adults (49 male, 51 female) between the ages of 18 and 27
(M=21.5, SD =3.09) participated in study 2. No significant differences (p<.05) were
between display conditions (the only between subjects variable) on propensity to trust,
technology experience, perceptual speed abilities, working memory abilities, spatial
orientation abilities, spatial visualization abilities, health status, or prescription drug plan
insurance purchasing experience. There were significant differences in the mean age
between display type groups (F(4, 95)=13.28, p<.000), such that subjects in the Pie (M
=18.15, SD=.366) condition were significantly younger than those in all other conditions
(i.e., Anthro (M=21.55, SD=2.86), EvalCat (M=21.4, SD=2.98), None
(M=23.2,SD=2.58), and Number (M=23.2, SD=2.8). Due to this difference in age
between display groups all analyses include analyses include age as a covariate for
effects of display type (the only between subjects variable). The remaining participant
characteristics are displayed in Table 4.
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Table 4.
Table 4.
Experiment 2 Participant Characteristics (N=100)
Category
Frequency Percentage
Gender
Female
51
51%
Male
49
49%
Race/Ethnicity
American Indian/Alaskan
1
1%
Asian
17
17%
Native Hawaiian/Pacific
Islander
1
1%
Black/African American
12
12%
White
59
59%
Hispanic
6
6%
Multiracial
1
1%
Other
3
3%
Marital status
Single
93
93%
Married
7
7%
Experience with computers?
Yes
100
100%
Computer experience (years)
At least 5 years
100
100%
Purchased health insurance?
Yes
20
20%
No
80
80%
If yes, how long?
< 6 months
12
60%
6 months but <1 year
4
20%
1 year but < 5 years
2
10%
5 years but <10 years
2
10%
Purchased prescription drug insurance?
Yes
9
9%
No
91
91%
If yes, how long?
< 6 months
3
33%
6 months but < 1 year
3
33%
1 year but < 5 years
3
33%
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Trust and Performance Measures
The following analyses are organized by the specific hypotheses outlined in the
previous section. A 4 (display type: anthro, nPie, evalcats, number) x 3 (system
confidence) x 2 (system confidence reliability-coupling) mixed factors ANOVA on
subjective trust, behavioral trust, time, accuracy and confidence was conducted. In
addition, to test the control condition (no system confidence display), an additional 3
(system confidence) x 2 (system confidence reliability-coupling) ANOVA on the same 5
dependent measures was conducted. Post-hoc analyses were conducted for significant
effects using Bonferroni corrections. The results are structured so that the results from
the first ANOVA for display conditions is presented first, followed by the second
ANOVA on the control (no display) condition.
Subjective Trust
Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated for
System confidence (χ2 (2) = 28.473, p < .001) and thus the degrees of freedom were
corrected using Huynh-Feldt estimates of sphericity, ε = .839 (Huynh & Feldt, 1976).
System-confidence-reliability coupling and the interaction between system confidence
and coupling both met the assumptions of sphericity and thus no degrees of freedom
corrections were made for those analyses.
The first ANOVA for display type conditions revealed significant main effects of
coupling (F(1, 76)=9.04, p<.004, ηp2 =.11) and system confidence (F(1.64, 124.6)=56.63,
p<.000, ηp2 =.43) on subjective trust. There was not a significant main effect of display
type (p=.23). Subjective trust was higher when system reliability and confidence were
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uncoupled (M=4.57, SD=1.22) than coupled (M=4.3, SD=1.08). Subjective trust ratings
increased as system confidence display level increased; trust was rated lower in the low
system confidence level (25% M=3.09, SD=1.06) than neutral (50% M=4.36, SD=1.11)
and high (75% M=4.66, SD=1.14) levels of system confidence. System confidence level
had the greater effect (ηp2 =.43) on subjective trust than coupling (ηp2 =.11).
Main effects were qualified by a significant interaction between coupling and
system confidence (F(5.99, 146)=15.83, p<.000, ηp2 =.17). The interaction between
coupling and system confidence (Figure 17) indicated that participants rated their trust in
the low (25%) and neutral (50%) confidence conditions significantly higher when
reliability and confidence were uncoupled than coupled (25% confidence: coupled
M=3.71, SD=1.08, uncoupled M=4.1, SD=1.26; 50% confidence: coupled M=4.14,
SD=1.11, uncoupled M=4.6, SD=1.27). There was no difference in subjective trust
between coupled and uncoupled conditions with the 75% system confidence level
display. In the coupled condition, subjective trust increased as system confidence
increased from 25% (M=3.71, SD=1.08) to 50% (M=4.14, SD=1.11) to 75% (M=4.68,
SD=1.16). In the uncoupled condition, trust was lower in the 25% (M=4.1, SD=1.25)
condition than in the 50% (M=4.59, SD=1.26) and 75% (M=4.62, SD=1.29). However, in
the uncoupled condition, there was no difference between the 50% and 75% conditions.
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Figure 17. Mean subjective trust by system confidence for all displays. Error bars
represent standard error of the mean.
For the no display condition (None), there was a significant main effect of system
confidence (F(1.32, 5.03)=4.96, p=.02, ηp2 =.21) and a significant interaction between
system confidence and coupling (F(1.88, 8.73)=4.09, p=.03, ηp2 =.18), but no main effect
of coupling (p=.09; see Figure 18). In the uncoupled condition, participants rated their
trust lower in the 25% confidence condition (M=4.95, SD=1.14) than in the 50%
confidence condition (M=5.28, SD=1.29). In the coupled conditions, there were no
differences in trust between system confidence display levels (p >.05). At 50% system
confidence (though not displayed), trust was higher in the uncoupled conditions (M=5.28,
SD=1.29) than the coupled conditions (M=4.7, SD=1.29), but there were no effects of
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coupling on subjective trust in the 25% and 75% system confidence conditions (p>.05).

Figure 18. Mean subjective trust by system confidence for no display. Error bars
represent standard error of the mean.
Behavorial trust and trust calibration
Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated for
System confidence (χ2 (2) = 11.2, p = .004) and thus the degrees of freedom were
corrected using Huynh-Feldt estimates of sphericity, ε = .954 (Huynh & Feldt, 1976).
System-confidence-reliability coupling and the interaction between system confidence
and coupling both met the assumptions of sphericity and thus no degrees of freedom
corrections were made for those analyses.
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The first analysis of display types resulted in no effect of display condition
(p=.95) on behavioral trust. There were main effects of coupling (F(1,76)=85.72, p<.000,
ηp2 =.53), system confidence (F(1.86,141.33)=149.7, p<.000, ηp2 =.66), and a significant
system confidence and coupling interaction (F(2,152)=57.04, p<.000, ηp2 =.43). The
results are graphed in Figure 19. Both system confidence (ηp2 =.66) and coupling (ηp2
=.43) had strong effects on behavioral trust.
When system confidence was 25% or 50%, participants were more likely to agree
with the DSS in the uncoupled conditions (25% M=2.64, SD=.51; 50% M=3.38, SD=.52)
than coupled conditions (25% M=2.1, SD=.55; 50% M=2.62, SD=.62). There was not a
significant difference in the 75% condition between coupled and uncoupled conditions
(p>.05). In the coupled condition, behavioral trust was significantly higher as system
confidence increased from 25% (M=2.1, SD=.55) to 50% (M=2.62, SD=.62) and to 75%
(M=3.15, SD=.53). In the uncoupled condition, although all 3 levels were significantly
different, the 50% condition had higher behavioral trust (M=3.38, SD=.52) than 25%
(M=2.65, SD=.51 and 75% conditions (M=3.13, SD=.52). Behavioral trust was also
higher overall in the uncoupled conditions (M=3.05, SD=.41) than the coupled conditions
(M=2.62, SD=.47).
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Figure 19. Mean behavioral trust by system confidence for all displays. Error bars
represent standard error of the mean.
For the no display condition analysis, there were significant main effects of
coupling (F(1,19)=127.29, p<.000, ηp2 =.87), system confidence (F(2,38)=36.18, p<.000,
ηp2 =.66), and a significant interaction between coupling and system confidence (F(1.9,
36.1)=26.96, p<.000, ηp2 =.59; see Figure 20). The same pattern emerged as in the
display condition analysis; participants were more likely to agree with the DSS when
coupled than uncoupled in the low (25% coupled M=2.19, SD=.41; 25% uncoupled
M=2.78, SD=.34) and neutral system confidence conditions (50% coupled M=2.49,
SD=.43; 50% uncoupled M=3.54, SD=.25). Additionally, overall trust was higher in the
uncoupled conditions (M=3.1, SD= .21) than coupled conditions (M=2.54, SD=.32). In
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the coupled condition, behavioral trust was significantly higher as system confidence
increased from 25% (M=2.18, SD=.41) to 50% (M=2.49, SD=.45) and to 75% (M=2.94,
SD=.45). However, in the uncoupled condition, although trust in all 3 system confidence
levels were significantly different from each other, the 50% condition had higher
behavioral trust (M=3.54, SD=.25) than 25% (M=2.78, SD=.34) and 75% (M=2.99,
SD=.29).

Figure 20. Mean behavioral trust by system confidence for no display. Error bars
represent standard error of the mean.
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Trust calibration was analyzed using Pearson correlations between system
reliability score and behavioral trust score across display types and system confidence
values. Although the planned analysis included running the 3 levels of system
confidence separately to determine if there was greater mistrust or distrust at different
levels of system confidence, this was not feasible. A system reliability score was
assigned to the 3 levels of system confidence (25%=1, 50%=2.5, 75%=4) in order to map
what should have been the appropriate behavioral trust response (i.e., 1=disagree, 2=peek
and disagree, 3=peek and agree, 4=agree). If correlations were run for each level of
system confidence, the system reliability score would be constant and thus a correlation is
not possible. Thus, the correlation analysis was run between coupling conditions and
across display conditions only and represents an overall trust calibration collapsed across
system confidence conditions.
Table 5 represents the Pearson correlation coefficients in order of magnitude for
the 5 display types and the coupled vs. uncoupled conditions. A Chi square test of
equality of independent correlations was conducted between display types and found no
significant differences (p>.05).
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Table 5.
Correlations Between Behavioral Trust and System Reliability Score
Display Type
R
p
Coupled (n=720)
Anthro
.320
<.000
Number
.290
<.000
Pie
.289
<.000
EvalCat
.281
<.000
None
.207
<.000
Uncoupled (n=720)
Anthro
Pie
Number
EvalCat
None

.220
.127
.123
.113
.064

<.000
.001
.001
.001
n.s.

Decision accuracy
System confidence violated the assumption of sphericity (Mauchly’s Test, (χ2 (2)
= 18.28, p < .000) and thus the degrees of freedom were corrected using Huynh-Feldt
estimates of sphericity, ε = .90 (Huynh & Feldt, 1976) for that variable only. All others
are reported with sphericity assumed values.
For the display type analysis, there were significant main effects of coupling (F(1,
95)=30.28, p<.000, ηp2 =.29) and system confidence (F(1.84, 139.9)=86.38, p<.000, ηp2
=.53). There was not a significant main effect of display type (p>.05). The significant
main effects were qualified by a significant interaction between coupling and system
confidence (F (2, 190)=21.42, p<.000, ηp2 =.22). System confidence had the greater
effect on accuracy (ηp2 =.53). These results are graphed in Figure 21.
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Participants were more accurate when system confidence and reliability were
uncoupled than coupled, but only in the 25% (coupled M=.59, SD=.15; uncoupled M=.74,
SD=.15) and 50% (coupled M=.74, SD=.14; uncoupled M=.79, SD=.10) conditions.
There was no difference in accuracy between coupling conditions in the 75% condition
(p>.05). In the coupled condition, accuracy increased as system confidence increased
from 25% (M=.59, SD=.15) to 50% (M=.74, SD=.14) to 75% (M=.81, SD=.09). In the
uncoupled condition, accuracy was higher in the 50% (M=.79, SD=.10) and 75% (M=.80,
SD=.12) condition compared to the 25% (M=.74, SD=.15) condition, but there was no
difference in accuracy between 50% (M=.79, SD=.10) and 75% (M=.80, SD=.12).

Figure 21. Percent accuracy by system confidence for all displays. Yellow bars represent
actual system reliability and error bars represent standard error of the mean.
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In the control analysis, there were significant main effects of coupling
(F(1,19)=15.73, p=.001, ηp2 =.87) and system confidence (F(1.73, 32.85)=4.98, p=.02,
ηp2 =.21), see Figure 22. The interaction, however, was insignificant. Coupling had a
larger effect on accuracy (ηp2 =.87) compared to system confidence level (ηp2 =.21).
Accuracy was higher in the uncoupled (M=.80, SD=.08) condition than in coupled
condition (M=.69, SD=.15). Accuracy was higher in the 50% (M=.78, SD=.13) and 75%
(M=.79, SD=.09) conditions than the 25% (M=.67, SD=.16) condition, but there was no
difference between the 50% (M=.78, SD=.13) and 75% (M=.79, SD=.09) conditions.

Figure 22. Percent accurate by system confidence for no display. Yellow bars represent
actual system reliability and error bars represent standard error of the mean.
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Decision task time
System confidence violated the assumption of sphericity (Mauchly’s Test, (χ2 (2)
= 39.9, p < .000) and thus the degrees of freedom were corrected using Huynh-Feldt
estimates of sphericity, ε = .784 (Huynh & Feldt, 1976) for that variable only. All other
results are reported with sphericity assumed values.
For the display type conditions, there was a significant main effects of system
confidence (F(1.53, 116.84)=68.95, p<.000, ηp2 =.48), but not of coupling or display type
(p>.05) on task time. However, there was a significant interaction with a small effect on
task time between system confidence and coupling (F(2, 150.63)=6.58, p=.002, ηp2 =.08)
and this is displayed in Figure 23. In the 50% condition, uncoupled task time (M=27.95,
SD=1.4) was significantly faster than coupled task time (M=30.94, SD=1.07). No
differences were found in coupling within the 25% and 75% conditions (p>.05). In the
coupled condition, time was faster as system confidence increased from 25% to 50% to
75% and all differences between levels were significant. In the uncoupled condition,
time was faster in the 50% and 75% conditions compared to 25%, however task time was
not significantly different between 50% and 75%.
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Figure 23. Mean task time by system confidence for all displays (in seconds). Error bars
represent standard error of the means.
In the control condition, there was a significant main effect of system confidence
(F(2, 38)=16.43, p<.000, ηp2 =.46), but not of coupling (p>.05) on task time. None of the
interactions were significant (p>.05). Figure 24 shows the effect of system confidence.
Task time was faster in the 50% (M=28.22, SD=5.4) and 75% (M=28.7, SD=4.69) system
confidence conditions compared to the 25% (M=31.28, SD=5.4) condition but the
difference in task time between 50% (M=28.22, SD=5.4) and 75% (M=28.7, SD=4.69)
was not significant.
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Figure 24. Mean task time by system confidence for no display (in seconds). Error bars
represent standard error of the means.
Confidence
For the display conditions, a significant main effect was present for system
confidence (F(2, 76)=9.98, p<.000, ηp2 =.12). Graphed in Figure 25. Participants rated
their confidence in their answer higher in the 75% system confidence condition (M=5.31,
SD=1.17) than in the 25% system confidence condition (M=5.05, SD=1.07). There was
no difference between the 50% condition and the 75% or 25% conditions (p>.05). For
the control condition, there were no significant main effects of any variable (p>.05).
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Figure 25. Mean subjective participant confidence ratings by system confidence for all
displays. Error bars represent standard error of the means.
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DISCUSSION
The main goals of the two experiments were to gain an understanding of trust
behavior with a DSS with different system confidence displays. Specifically, affective
displays in the form of an anthropomorphic face display and the use of evaluative
categories was compared to more traditional displays (i.e., Pie graph, Number, or None).
Affective displays were thought to evoke more automatic feelings of goodness or badness
(or in this case, trustworthiness) and thus influence verification behavior when it is
appropriate (i.e., in low system confidence conditions). Anthropomorphic face displays
were designed to convey system confidence through affect, similar to how confidence
and trust are conveyed in face to face interactions. Following this logic, trust was
expected to be better calibrated when reading faces for confidence compared to a number
or a more traditional display (i.e., numerical display, bar graph, or pie graph) where the
user has to interpret the meaning of a number and decide whether to trust the DSS.
Study Hypotheses
H1: A 3-way interaction was predicted such that in the low system confidence
condition (25%) and neutral system confidence condition (50%) but not in the high
system confidence condition (75%), subjective trust (DV) was higher in the
anthropomorphic faces and evaluative categories conditions than the other 3 conditions
(i.e., pie condition, number only condition, and no system confidence condition), but only
when system confidence was coupled with reliability. In the uncoupled condition, no
effect of system confidence level or system confidence display was expected.
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H2. Higher correlations between system reliability and average behavioral trust are
predicted for participants in the faces and evaluative categories conditions, in comparison
to the non-affective conditions, but only when system confidence is coupled with
reliability. Participants in the affective conditions (i.e., faces and evaluative categories)
were expected to better trust the DSS’s system confidence value. In other words,
participants were expected to have a higher overall trust (subjective trust) in the DSS’s
ability to report an accurate system confidence value and would thus engage more often
in verification behavior (i.e., peeking or disagreeing with the DSS) when system
confidence was low (25% or neutral 50%). When system confidence was high,
participants would be more likely to comply (i.e., agree) with the DSS.
H3. A 3-way interaction was predicted such that in the low system confidence condition
(25%) and neutral system confidence condition (50%) but not the high confidence
condition (75%), decision accuracy (DV) would behigher in the anthropomorphic faces
and evaluative categories conditions than the other 3 conditions (i.e., graph condition,
number only condition, and no system confidence conditions), but only when system
confidence was coupled with reliability. In the uncoupled condition, no effect of system
confidence level or system confidence display was expected. Participants in the affective
conditions (i.e., anthropomorphic faces and evaluative categories) were expected to have
higher overall subjective trust in the DSS. Similar to the justification of H3, participants
would trust that a low (25%) and neutral (50%) system confidence rating requires
verification and a high system confidence rating (75%) does not. If the user’s behavioral
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trust is appropriately calibrated with system reliability (and if system reliability and
system confidence are coupled), then accuracy was expected to be higher.

H4: A main effect of system confidence display on task time (DV) was predicted such
that participants in the anthropomorphic faces condition will perform faster across all
levels of system confidence and system confidence-reliability relationship, followed by
the evaluative categories condition, graph condition, number only condition, and then the
no system confidence condition. This prediction was based on the differences in the
automaticity of processing feelings of trustworthiness between each of these conditions,
as explained in the introduction and independent variables section of study 1.
Furthermore, if users trusted the DSS and complied with its suggestion, there would not
be a time cost associated with verification behavior (i.e., peeking and checking other
answers).
None of the above hypotheses were supported by the results because there were
no effects of display type on any of the dependent variables. The theoretical basis for
these predictions was that numbers were replaced by affective information to relay
system confidence information, that it would increase trust and reduce the effort needed
to make a decision. One possible explanation as to why there were no effects of the
anthro display condition may be that the degree of anthropomorphism was too low to
influence trust (Lee & See, 2004). A low degree of anthropomorphism was chosen for
this study to eliminate confounds of age, gender, attractiveness, and expertise of the DSS.
Perhaps the degree of anthropomorphism was too low and did not evoke affective
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feelings of goodness or badness. The anthro display may have had a greater influence on
trust if a more context-appropriate anthropomorphic “agent” was used, such as a medical
professional or financial professional.
Another potential explanation for a lack of subjective trust differences between
the anthro display and other display types may be rooted in dispositional trust or
preconceived notions about the trustworthiness of the DSS. Previous research has shown
that people lack trust of insurance companies and their agents (Hunter, Whiddett, Norris,
McDonald, & Waldon, 2009) and this task involved choosing a prescription drug plan
from a list of tables. Previous research examining trust in a health information sharing
context indicated that people have a general distrust of sharing any information with
health insurance agents or companies that determine eligibility when compared to doctors
and medical professionals. Thus, if the DSS that was providing the suggestion was
viewed as untrustworthy due to preconceived notions of insurance companies and the
agents that work for them, then perhaps participants were simply unable to trust the
anthro face display an intended.
Another possible explanation is that the system confidence display was not being
used by participants and thus was not influencing trust. The effects of coupling, system
confidence display, and task type implications are discussed in the following sections.
Effects of Coupling
To review, two conditions were included in this study to evaluate whether system
confidence information was being utilized differently than reliability information, and
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whether participants could detect the difference between system confidence and
reliability when it was not equal (or uncoupled). Three levels of system confidence were
used, 25%, 50%, and 75%. In the system confidence-reliability coupled condition, the
reliability matched the system confidence value (i.e., when system confidence was 25%,
the answer was correct 25% of the time). In the uncoupled condition, reliability was 67%
for each of the 3 system confidence levels. Ideally, participants should not use the
system confidence information in the 25% and 50% conditions and instead should ignore
that value and trust the DSS most of the time. In the coupled conditions, trust should
increase as system confidence increases to correctly match the reliability of the system.
In the coupled condition, participants in the condition with the system confidence
display were able to detect differences between the 3 levels of system confidence, as
evidenced by their high trust ratings as system confidence improved (subjective trust) and
by greater verification behavior (behavioral trust) when system confidence was low and
neutral versus high. As expected, this increase in verification behavior led to higher task
times in the low and neutral conditions compared to the high system confidence
condition. Although participants did perform more accurately than the system at all
levels of system confidence, accuracy was still lowest in the 25% system confidence
condition. Although lower, the system was only 25% accurate, but participants were
accurate 59% of the time. Participants’ accuracy did benefit from the additional
verification or peeking behavior. These findings are similar to what previous studies
found, system confidence displays help users detect when they should and should not
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trust the system and this leads to better performance when system confidence and
reliability are equal (Spain & Bliss, 2009; McGuirl & Sarter, 2006).
In the uncoupled conditions, participants should have rated trust the same across
all three levels of system confidence because reliability was actually the same across all
levels. Instead, participants rated their trust lower in the 25% condition than the 50% or
75% conditions. Participants also engaged in more verification behavior at 50% than
25% or 75%, where there should have been no difference in verification behavior because
reliability was the same across all 3 system confidence levels. However, if participants
were using system confidence information instead of reliability, it would be expected that
it would follow the same pattern as the coupled condition. Instead, 50% system
confidence seemed to cause confusion and lead to more instances of verification. The
additional verification behavior did lead to higher accuracy in the 50% system confidence
level condition over the 25% system confidence condition. Interestingly, this difference
in the 50% did not lead to greater task time in this condition, and instead participants
were faster in the 50% and 75% conditions than the 25% condition, eliminating the
possibility of speed accuracy tradeoff in the 25% condition.
The results indicate that having system confidence is helpful when system
confidence matches reliability, in accordance with previous studies (Spain & Bliss, 2009;
McGuirl & Sarter, 2004). However, when the relationship between system confidence
and reliability are uncoupled, this can lead to problems, particularly if system confidence
for a trial is low but the DSS has high reliability (at least 67%). Having a system
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confidence display of 25% when system reliability was 67% led to distrust and
diminished accuracy, trust, and speed.
One major limitation in the comparison between coupled and uncoupled
conditions exists in this study. Overall reliability was actually higher in the uncoupled
condition (67%) than in the coupled condition (50%). This is the most probable
explanation for why main effects of coupling always favored the uncoupled condition for
each dependent variable. Even so, participants should have noticed the greater disparity
between 25% reliability and 67% reliability in the uncoupled condition compared to a
25% to 50% disparity in the coupled condition, and not allowed the system confidence
value to bias their trust and behavior. Instead, participants relied on the system
confidence value, even when they shouldn’t have.
Effects of System Confidence Display
Were participants using the system confidence display or simply learning the
reliability of the system over time using the feedback? The inclusion of the control
condition (which did not present any system confidence information) allows for the
comparison between the patterns in trust, time, and accuracy when the display is present
and when it is absent.
The initial planned analysis did not show any differences between any of the
display condition types and the control display. However, the control was run separately
in the analysis to better understand the effects of coupling and system confidence levels.
In the control condition, reliability changed in the coupled conditions, but the participant
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had no information to alert them to this change. Essentially, the participant had a 67%
reliable system (uncoupled) and a 50% reliable system (coupled). If participants were not
able to detect the change in reliability between trials in the coupled system without the
system confidence information (e.g., trials with 25% reliability) then it would suggest
that participants did benefit from having the system confidence display. In this case, the
pattern in the coupled condition would remain the same without the display as the pattern
in performance with the display.
In the coupled conditions, participants did not rate their trust differently as
reliability changed between 25%, 50%, and 75%, but they were more likely to engage in
verification behavior as reliability decreased (i.e., more likely to peek when reliability
was 25%). Accuracy, however did not improve as peeking behavior increased. The
increase in peeking behavior in the low reliability condition without the system
confidence display means participants were using reliability information to drive
behavior. The DSS provided 1 recommendation, which the participant likely first
checked for accuracy against the criteria in the question, since all possible answers were
shown in the table. At that point, they would know if the DSS was reliable or not. If the
DSS was deemed unreliable on that trial, the participant would choose to peek or
disagree. However, the participant still had to find the correct answer. If the participant
peeked, they were given 3 other answers that they would still need to verify. The time
constraint may have been adequate to determine if the suggestion from the DSS was
reliable, but inadequate to determine the correct answer, even with the other 3
possibilities to shorten the task.
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The fact that users were able to determine reliability changes in the coupled
condition without the use of system confidence challenges the idea that it is beneficial to
provide system confidence. In a highly reliable system, a low system confidence value
may not mean that the DSS is unreliable (e.g., as in the uncoupled condition), but instead
that there are similar choices that make it difficult for the system to determine which is
the best choice. The low system confidence rating may lead the user to distrust the
system, causing worse performance and lower efficiency if the user tries to make the
decision on their own. This is especially true in cases where there are minimal
consequences for not choosing the best choice, but instead choosing one that is good
enough. However, in scenarios where there are high or risky consequences for not
choosing the best or correct answer, perhaps the added verification behavior is warranted.
In that situation, the information should be structured so that it is easier for the user to
find the correct answer.
Task Type and Expertise
In comparison to previous studies, this consumer-like task was much different.
The task was designed to be resource limited instead of data limited, provided multiple
answers to choose from, and was non-compensatory. All of the information needed to
find the correct answer was provided to the participant, unlike previous studies where
information was degraded (Spain & Bliss, 2009) or expertise was needed to evaluate a
complex strategy where trade-offs could be made between options (McGuirl & Sarter,
2004). Participants were able to evaluate the reliability of the suggestion quickly because
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the DSS narrowed down the information needed to choose whether to agree, disagree, or
peek.
In this respect, having all of the information available reduces the need to rely on
one’s own self-confidence the way an expert user might. An expert may decide whether
to trust the automation based on their confidence in their own ability to solve the
problem. In this study, novice users with little domain expertise (i.e., insurance
purchasing knowledge) would have been more likely to doubt themselves and trust the
automation. However, the user was able to quickly verify the DSSs suggestion and thus
determine reliability on a trial by trial basis. Increased verification behavior indicates
that participants were using the automation to find an answer rather than solving it on
their own as an expert user might. This task however, did not require domain expertise
would not have helped the participant choose the correct answer as each still had to meet
the requirements in the question.
Limitations and Future Research
One possible limitation of this study was the degree of anthropomorphism used in
the system confidence display. Previous research has shown that the increasing the
degree of anthropomorphism leads to higher ratings of competency and trustworthiness
(Gong, 2008). The faces in this study might be classified as low-level anthropomorphism
(Gong, 2008) because they were more robot-like than human-like. Further research
should look at the effects of higher level anthropomorphic displays (i.e., those that look

85

more like actual human faces) and matching similar characteristics such as gender, age,
and ethnicity.
Although the anthro display did not have a positive effect as predicted on trust
and performance in this study, it also did not negatively affect performance. Participants
were able to distinguish between low, neutral, and high levels of system confidence
through faces just as easily as the numerical display. This suggests that it is safe to
replace other displays with an anthro display that may be more comforting, likeable, or
satisfying to a user than traditional displays. Future research should examine whether
users would rate the system more enjoyable to use with an anthro display.
Future research should also examine different types of consumer tasks without
time constraints. If the task in this study had been designed without the time constraint,
it’s possible that participants may have also improved their accuracy, most likely at the
expense of efficiency. Most consumer decisions such as choosing a prescription drug
plan would not have such a strict time constraint. The decision itself would still be
resource intensive without the DSS. The inclusion of the DSS changes the nature of the
task to a verification task from a difficult non-compensatory task. Instead of having to
examine every option and attribute, the participant had to verify the answer. This may
restrict generalization to other tasks that do not list all possible options for comparison or
tasks where alternative suggestions are not provided under a “peek” option.
A major limitation in this study was that the coupled and uncoupled conditions
did not have the same overall reliability. Future research should examine more varied
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levels of reliability and system confidence and keep them constant between conditions.
This is difficult to do because the number of tasks must remain feasible while providing
enough to explore different ratios of accuracy (i.e., there must be enough tasks to have
40%, 50%, 60% reliability). It would be beneficial to know if there are ranges of system
confidence where verification behavior is more likely (e.g., how low is system
confidence) or less likely (e.g., how high is system confidence) to occur.

In addition,

future studies examining system confidence displays should include a control condition
without a display to differentiate the effects of reliability and system confidence.
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CONCLUSION
Providing system confidence information may not always provide benefits. In
this study, system confidence information may have been less influential than reliability.
Instead, it may be more beneficial to provide users with easy to evaluate alternative
recommendations that can be verified against certain criteria. This better allows users to
determine the DSS’s reliability on a trial by trial basis and does not pose the potential of
creating an uncoupled relationship between system reliability and system confidence.
Furthermore, providing system confidence may be a costly endeavor. The amount of
effort it would take to program an accurate algorithm to calculate the probability that the
answer is correct may not help the user, especially if the system is already highly reliable.
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Appendix A
Participant Handout of System Confidence Conditions

Image values
25%

50%

90

75%
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Image values
25%

50%
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Appendix B
Protocol for MX study 1

THINGS TO DO BEFORE SUBJECT ARRIVES
Day of:
1. Prepare the computers
A. Place IRB information sheet in front of each computer
B. Make sure the headphones are plugged in. Subjects can adjust volume
during the abilities test.
C. On an experimenter computer, open \Desktop\Dropbox\Exp (1) then
launch the dashboard program. Use the IP address that it specifies
(it’s the IP address of the experimenter computer)at each of the
subject running computers.
D. Go back to the Exp1 folder, then open the “Margaux” folder
i. Open the file ‘Margaux.exe’
a. Enter subject # (use next # from list)
b. Check to make sure the stimulus presentation time is
set to 3000 & 5000
c. Click on the optional tab
d. Set the “Number of trials in Phase 1” to: 50 and “Block
speed” to 100
e. Enter dashboard IP Address and set workstation # (on
post it note at each participant station)
ii. Close the Dropbox folder window
E. Place a post-it note with the subject # at each station for your
reference, also fill out the form for subject #’s.
TIPS:


If subject accidently presses a key before you are ready, you can skip past the
tetris game by restarting the program, but in the “Options” tab, set the
“Number of trials in Phase 1” to 1. They will only have to match 1 set of
blocks and it will move on to phase 2. You cannot skip phase 2.



The 2nd and 3rd task both take approximately 8-9 minutes. You can time it so
you know when subjects will be ready for the next step1
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2. Go ahead and read the IRB information sheet on your desk and let me know if
you have any questions.
3. Please go ahead and enter your age and gender, you can then click “Begin
Study” but please do not click anything else until I tell you do so.
4. Ok, please listen as I guide you through the instructions and practice tasks. In
today’s study you will be completing a block matching task that is similar to
the game tetris. You will also be identifying levels of images as they pop up
while you play the block game. You will have the opportunity to practice both
tasks before the experiment begins.
Block matching game practice instructions
5. Please click “OK” and follow along as I read aloud the instructions for the
first task, a block matching game. In this game, you must match at least three
blocks vertically or horizontally of the same color. But you can only switch
any two blocks horizontally. Use the cursor keys (up, down, left, right) to
move your selector. Press the space bar to switch blocks. Please work as
quickly as you can to increase your score. When your score reaches 50 this
practice will end automatically, but please do not start the next task. Go
ahead and click the “Start Practice” button to begin.
Graphic identification task
6. [When everyone finishes]Ok, in this next task, you will notice on the right
side of the screen that a graphic will appear in the white box. When you see
the graphic you should identify the level represented by it. You will use the
keys from 1 to 3 to indicate:
1 = 25%
2 = 50%
3= 75%
[Give participants the handout]. This handout shows the images that you
will see in this task. As you can see, sometimes there will be numbers with
the images and sometimes there won’t be. In the first column are all of the
images that represent 25%. The second column shows the images that
represent 50%, and the last column has all images that represent 75%.
Please take a moment to look this over and let me know if you have any
questions. Once you think you have had enough time to look this over, please
turn around and look at me so I know when everyone has had enough time.
You can keep the handout for a reference if you would like, however you may
not have time to look up the image before it disappears on the screen.
7. Does anyone have any questions? Ok, you should use your best judgment.
When you are ready to begin the task, please click “Start practice”. When you
complete the practice, please STOP.
Dual task instructions
8. [After the practice]Now, you will do both tasks at the same time. That is, you
will have the blocks game and the graphic task occurring at the same time.
Like before, you will control the blocks game by using the cursor keys (up,
down, left, right) and the space bar to switch any two blocks horizontally.
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You will also identify the level of the graphic in the far right. Like before,
1 = 25%,
2 = 50%
3= 75%
Doing these two tasks at the same time is very challenging. Your main focus
should be the blocks game. You should try to maximize your score as quickly
as possible. Any reserve attention you have available should be used for the
graphic task. Do you have any questions?
9. When you finish this task, please stop and let me know when you are done.
Go ahead and click “start experiment”
Abilities:
10. Click “Start” to get to demographics screen. After the demographics come up,
click the lower right corner.
11. On the desktop, click on the shortcut to “Shortcut to Clip” then “run” (if it
asks). Next, on the desktop, open “Shortcut to abilities.exe”.
A. Enter the subject #
B. Enter Experiment ID as MxStudy1
C. Make sure ONLY paper folding, cube comparison, and No RDS, MEM,
Ship are checked
D. Click ok
E. Tell participant, “Please read through the instructions carefully and
continue through until the computer tells you that you are finished.
This will be the end of today’s study.”
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Appendix C
Explanation of insurance terms used in the decision task and example table
Term
Gap Coverage

Monthly Premium
Annual Deductible

Satisfaction Rating

Definition
Gap coverage refers to the period of time after you
and your plan have spent a certain amount of
money for covered drugs when you have to pay
out-of-pocket all costs for your drugs. Once you
reach a set amount of out-of-pocket costs, your
plan will begin coverage again. This term refers
to the coverage provided during this “gap” in
coverage.
The monthly premium is the set amount you must
pay monthly.
The annual deductible or the amount you must pay
for your prescriptions, before your drug plan
begins to pay.
An overall score on the drug plan's quality and
performance on customer service, member
complaints, member experience, and pricing and
patient safety

Monthly
Annual
Name Gap coverage
Premium Deductible Summary Rating
No gap
Lowest
Lowest
Plan A
$1
$1 1.0 out of 5 stars
coverage
coverage
rating
Plan B Some generics
$2
$2 2.0 out of 5 stars
Plan C Many generics
$3
$3 3.0 out of 5 stars
Plan D Most generics
$4
$4 4.0 out of 5 stars
Highest
Highest
Plan E All generics
$5
$5 5.0 out of 5 stars
coverage
rating
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Appendix D
Study #2 Protocol
Protocol for Dissertation Study #2

THINGS TO DO BEFORE SUBJECT ARRIVES
1. Determine which condition you will run (see the spreadsheet)
2. Prepare the computers
A. Make sure all computers are set to 1280 x 1024 screen resolution
(once these are set they do not need to be reset to the previous
resolution)
B. Go to the “Dropbox” folder on the desktop, click on the Margaux
folder, then study 2 folder
C. Now open the program by double clicking “mgx-study2.exe”
i. Enter a subject number
ii. Leave Age and Gender blank
iii. Click “Click to select a condition file” button
iv. When the open dialog box appears, select your condition file:
v. Click the big red button before the subject arrives to hide the
condition information.
D. Place the sheet of paper with the plan information on the left of the
keyboard and [if anthro or eval cat conditions] place the less
confident/more confident sheet on the right of the keyboard.
E. Place the consent form on top of the keyboard.

AFTER SUBJECTS HAVE ARRIVED AND HAVE BEEN SEATED [ALL
CONDITIONS]
3. "Welcome to the study, thanks for coming in today. Please set your cell
phones to silent. Go ahead and read the information sheet on your keyboard.
When you are finished, please look at me so I know. Does anyone have any
questions about the consent forms?
4. In today's study, you will be using the computer to make choose a
prescription drug plan that best fits the criteria asked in the question. Some
of the questions are designed to be very difficult. All we ask is that you try
your best and guess if necessary. As you answer the questions, the computer
will keep track of your score. As you get questions correctly and quickly,
your score will increase. This will be indicated in a bar graph on your screen.
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Your score is based on whether you get the question correct AND how
quickly you respond. The quicker you make your response, the more points
you get assuming you are correct.
5. Ok, first there are several terms that you may need to know in order to do the
decision task. Please take a look at the sheet of paper in front of you. You can
keep this out during the experiment as a reference if you need it.
a. In the first column you will see the plan name. These are simply listed
in alpha order by plan name.
b. Gap coverage is in the second column. Gap coverage refers to the
period of time after you and your plan have spent a certain amount of
money for covered drugs when you have to pay out-of-pocket all costs
for your drugs. Once you reach a set amount of out-of-pocket costs,
your plan will begin coverage again. This term refers to the coverage
provided during this “gap” in coverage. There are 5-levels of gap
coverage. Here, the levels are presented in order. No gap coverage is
the lowest amount, and all generics is the highest amount
c. The “monthly premium” is the set amount you must pay monthly.
d. The next is the “annual deductible”, or the amount you must pay for
your prescriptions, before your drug plan begins to pay. The dollar
amounts will be in these columns.
e. Finally, he satisfaction rating is in the last column and contains the
rating out of a 5-point scale. This rating is an overall score on the
drug plan's quality and performance on customer service, member
complaints, member experience, and pricing and patient safety
f. Do you have any questions about that? Ok, let’s start the computer
task. Please wiggle your mouse to get the screen to come up.
6. Please enter your age and gender. Next, please click the “Begin Study”
button and then click “YES”. This is the first of three practice trials. As you
see in front of you, you see a large box on the left with a table of prescription
drug plans.
7. On the lower portion of the screen you see a smaller question box that has
the criteria that the plan you choose must meet.
8. On the lower left you see your timer bar. This slowly counts down 45
seconds. The more time you take in answering your questions, the fewer
points you will earn toward your score even if you are correct.
9. In the upper right you see your overall score. As you answer questions
correctly and quickly, your score will increase.
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10. Remember, your task will be to find the prescription drug plan that best
meets the criteria in the questions. There is an automated system to help you
choose the correct plan.
11. You will be using two different systems today, system A and system B to
answer a total of 72 questions. Both systems are mostly reliable. You will
have answer 36 questions using each system and there will be a short break
while we switch from one system to another. We will try three practice
questions so that you can become familiar with your task. Do you have any
questions before we begin the practice?”
12. Normally, you will have 45 second time limit, however these practice tasks
are not timed.
[from here on follow directions for the condition you are running]
NO SYSTEM CONFIDENCE CONDITION: PAGE 3
SYSTEM CONFIDENCE DISPLAY CONDITIONS (NUMBER, GRAPH, EVALUATIVE
CATEGORIES, OR ANTHRO FACE CONDITIONS): PAGE 4

[FOR NO SYSTEM CONFIDENCE CONDITION ONLY]
13. Let’s go through a trial together. On the right, you see a suggestion from the
system. It has analyzed the situation and has made a suggestion. Let's see
how to use this system. Please read the scenario and the question but do not
proceed. I'll give you a few seconds to read it.
[wait to see that everyone has read it]
14. Ok. Let's say that you agree with the system’s recommendation. Please press
AGREE.
15. Next, please rate how confident you felt about the choice you just made.
Since this is just practice you are probably not sure about your confidence
level, but please answer anyway.
16. Also please rate how much you trust the automated system and its advice.
Again, this is just practice and you may not know what you think about the
aid right now, but please just answer. Using your mouse, click one of the
squares that is closest to how you feel then click OK. Any of the squares can
be clicked.
17. You can see that you get feedback that your choice was correct. Now, let's try
another practice task. Please read the next question. Again, don't proceed
until I say so.
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[wait to see that everyone has read it]
Let's now disagree with the automation. Please click the disagree button.
18. Now, some multiple choices have appeared in the lower right. You can now
select what you think is the correct answer. In this case, although the system
suggested Plan J, let’s say you think it is Plan A. Go ahead and select Plan A
and click MAKE CHOICE.
19. Again, you see the rating scale about your confidence and trust. Please
answer to the best of your ability.
20. Now you see feedback about your response to the question.
21. Now, let's go through one last practice question. Please read the scenario and
stop after you read the question.
[wait to see that everyone has read it]
22. Now, say you agree with the automation but you want to make absolutely
sure so you want to see what your options could be.
23. In this case, click the PEEK at options button. Here, you can see the multiple
choice options without yet agreeing or disagreeing with the system.
Remember, if you peek, you get 10 seconds removed from your clock.
Clicking on the answers listed on the peek dropbox will not answer the
question, answers can only be individually chosen after clicking disagree.
24. After peeking, you eventually agree with the aid so go ahead and click Agree.
25. Now, rate your confidence and trust and click OK.
26. Do you have any questions before you begin the study? From this point, you
will now be answering questions using the computer. If you have any
questions during the study, I will be sitting right here. When you are done
with the first set of 36 questions the computer will notify you. At the end of
the second set, there are additional surveys you’ll need to complete, so please
let me know so I can get you started.

[FOR THE SYSTEM CONFIDENCE CONDITIONS ONLY]
14. In the top right box you will see a display that shows the system’s confidence in
its suggestion. System confidence is “a system generated estimation of whether it
is providing a correct suggestion” and that it “is based on the quality of the
information it is using for providing a suggestion, on a trial by trial basis. If the
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system has low confidence, it is likely that it does not have much information to
help it make a decision, the information is degraded, or there are other choices
that are very similar and hard to choose between. If the system has high
confidence, it is likely that the system has plenty of good information and that one
prescription drug plan is much better than the others”. There is a sheet on the
right side of your desk that shows the 3 different confidence images you may see.
Please take a moment to look this over and let me know if you have any
questions.
15. Let’s go through a trial together. This is the first of three practice trials. As
you see in front of you, you see a large box on the left with a table of
prescription drug plans. On the lower portion of the screen you see a smaller
question box about the plans presented above it.
16. On the lower left you see your timer bar. This slowly counts down 45
seconds. The more time you take in answering your questions, the less
points you will earn toward your score even if you are correct.
17. In the upper right you see your overall score. As you answer questions
correctly and quickly, your score will increase.
18. Please read the scenario and the question but do not proceed. I'll give you a
few seconds to read it.
19. On the right, you see a suggestion from the system. It has analyzed the
situation and has made a suggestion. Let's see how to use this system. Please
read the scenario and the question but do not proceed. I'll give you a few
seconds to read it.
[wait to see that everyone has read it]
20. Ok. Let's say that you agree with the system’s recommendation. Please press
AGREE.
21. Next, please rate how confident you felt about the choice you just made.
Since this is just practice you are probably not sure about your confidence
level, but please answer anyway.
22. Also please rate how much you trust the automated system and its advice.
Again, this is just practice and you may not know what you think about the
aid right now, but please just answer. Using your mouse, click one of the
squares that is closest to how you feel then click OK. Any of the squares can
be clicked.
23. You can see that you get feedback that your choice was correct. Now, let's try
another practice task. Please read the next question. Again, don't proceed
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until I say so.
[wait to see that everyone has read it]
Let's now disagree with the automation. Please click the disagree button.
24. Now, some multiple choices have appeared in the lower right. You can now
select what you think is the correct answer. In this case, although the system
suggested Plan J, let’s say you think it is Plan A. Go ahead and select Plan A
and click MAKE CHOICE.
25. Again, you see the rating scale about your confidence and trust. Please
answer to the best of your ability.
26. Now you see feedback about your response to the question.
27. Now, let's go through one last practice question. Please read the scenario and
stop after you read the question.
[wait to see that everyone has read it]
28. Now, say you agree with the automation but you want to make absolutely
sure so you want to see what your options could be.
29. In this case, click the PEEK at options button. Here, you can see the multiple
choice options without yet agreeing or disagreeing with the system.
Remember, if you peek, you get 10 seconds removed from your clock.
Clicking on the answers listed on the peek dropbox will not answer the
question, answers can only be individually chosen after clicking disagree.
30. After peeking, you eventually agree with the aid so go ahead and click Agree.
31. Now, rate your confidence and trust and click OK.
[wait to see that everyone has read it]
32. Do you have any questions before you begin the study? From this point, you
will now be answering questions using the computer. If you have any
questions during the study, I will be sitting right here. When you are done
with the first set of 36 questions the computer will notify you. At the end of
the second set, there are additional surveys you’ll need to complete, so please
let me know so I can get you started.
[after they finish the first round]
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33. Ok, do you want to take a short break while I set up the other system? I just
need to enter some things into the computer to get it started.
[look at the subject list to determine which csv file to load. Enter in subject #,
and hide the options. Have the participant enter age and gender]
Before you begin, you may get a message after trial 3 that says the practice is over.
Just ignore the message and click ok to continue. When you are done, let me know
and I will have you do a few surveys.
[when done with block 2, open up the shortcut to 2.Tech Exp survey on the
desktop. Enter subject #]
34. Ok, please fill this out and let me know when you are finished.
[when finished – open up abilities, enter subject # and make sure that paper
folding and cub comparison, and “no RDS, MEM” is checked].
35. Ok, this is the last thing you have to do. Keep following the instructions until the
computer tells you that you have finished everything. If there is a continue button,
please just keep going. Let me know if you have any questions along the way.
[when finished…]
That is the end of the experiment, thank you so much for coming in today!
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